The Buddha\u27s Parable and Legal Rhetoric by Zlotnick, David M.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 3 Article 5
Summer 6-1-2001
The Buddha's Parable and Legal Rhetoric
David M. Zlotnick
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Legal Writing and Research Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David M. Zlotnick, The Buddha's Parable and Legal Rhetoric, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 957 (2001),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol58/iss3/5
The Buddha's Parable and Legal Rhetoric
David M. Zlotnick*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ....................................... 958
11. The Parable as Epistemic Mirror ....................... 961
A. The Original Parable and the Eastern View of Truth ..... 961
B. The Parable and the Implicit Essentialism of Legal
Scholarship .................................... 965
1. The Parable in Doctrinal Scholarship and Judicial
Opinions .................................. 965
2. The Blind Men Parable as Seen by Interdisciplinary
Scholars and Other Optimists ................... 975
III. The Parable and Self-Conscious Scholarship .............. 980
A. The Nihilist Version of the Parable .................. 980
B. The Parable and Eastern Concepts of Truth in Legal
Scholarship .................................... 985
C. Pragmatism, the Parable, and Legal Scholarship ........ 990
D. The Parable and Legal Scholarship Revisited .......... 998
IV. Rhetoric, Legal Scholarship & the Parable ................ 999
A. Rhetorical Theory and the Parable as Trope ........... 999
B. The Parable and the Debate Over Narrative Scholarship . 1009
V. Conclusion ...................................... 1011
* Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. Harvard Law
School, J.D. 1986. The author wishes to thank Colleen Murphy for encouraging him to pursue
this topic as well as Susan Ayres, Diana Hassel, Peter Margulies, Pierre Schlag, and Michael
Yelnosky for their comments on earlier drafts. Appreciation is also due to Bill Nelson of New
York University School of Law for leading a series of round table discussions about scholarship
that contributed to the development of this Article and to the faculty of the Boyd School of Law,
University of Nevada-Las Vegas for their suggestions at a faculty colloquium. Finally, this Arti-
cle could not have been completed without the dedicated research assistance of Helena Pacheco,
Danielle Jenkins, Lucy Holmes, and Christy Hetherington.
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 957 (2001)
We don't see the world as it is. We see it as we are.
- AnaisNin
I Introduction
This Article is about rhetoric, truth, and legal scholarship. More specifi-
cally, it explores how legal scholars use rhetorical devices to illustrate their
beliefs about the relationship between scholarship and truth. The vehicle for
this discussion is a specific rhetorical device - the parable - and more particu-
larly, an ancient Eastern parable that has found its way into our children's
storybooks and into literally hundreds of law review articles and judicial
opinions. Ultimately, this Article urges legal scholars in all fields of inquiry
to consider more carefully both their epistemic assumptions and their rhetori-
cal choices - for the sake of each scholarly project and to improve the quality
of the debate over legal scholarship in the post-modem era.
But first, the parable. It is a story many of us know from childhood. A
group of blind men encounter an elephant. Each blind man touches a different
part of the elephant's body and then incorrectly proclaims that the entire
elephant resembles his section. The blind man who felt the leg believes that
an elephant is like a tree; the tusk-toucher compares the elephant to a spear;
and so on. The trunk is like a snake, the body a house, the ears a fan, the tail
a rope, until every blind man has spoken.' Disagreement then ensues. Never-
theless, the Westernized versions found in children's books, reporters, and law
reviews in American libraries usually arrive at a happy ending. Eventually,
the blind men are able to figure out that an elephant actually has all these
qualities, either because of the intervention of an outsider,2 because the wisest
of the blind men has an insight,3 or because the blind men finally listen to one
another and piece it together as a group.' Thus, the moral of the modem
1. The source of the parable for many modem writers is the verse version that appears
in ThE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN GODFREY SAXE, THE BLIND MEN AND THE EMANT: A
HINDoo FABLE 111 (1859). Saxe's poem has itself been the subject ofAmerican litigation. See
Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Sch., 582 F. Supp. 201, 202 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (rejecting
parent's claim that parable should be banned from school book because it was hostile to reli-
gion).
2. SeeLKnLANQUIGL.Y,THEBMMIEAND THEELEPHANT24 (1959) (discussing how
rajah reveals truth to blind men).
3. See ED YOUNG, SEVEN BLIND MICE 29-34 (1992) (discussing how last blind mouse
discovers truth by running across entire elephant).
4. SeeAl GoreAddress at~ioEarth Summit, 59 TENN. L. REV. 645,646(1992) ("Only
after enough time had passed and enough communication had taken place was there a realiza-
tion that they each had a separate part of the same beast."). The various English language
versions are generally similar to this version with other minor variations, such as the number
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version, whether implicit or stated outright, is obvious: "To find out the whole
truth, [one] must put all the parts together.0
Lawyers, law professors and jurists have invoked this simple parable in
a startling quantity and array of contexts.6 From former Vice President Al
Gore to Judge Harold Kozinski to Professors Amar, Kramer, and Koh,7 legal
scholars and jurists by the dozens invoke the blind men and the elephant
parable to dramatize their points or to enliven their prose.' However, because
of blind men or the parts of the body touched. See MARIA LEACH NOODLES, Nrrwirs, AND
NuhsKuIs 54 (1961) (discussing how four blind men touch leg, tail, ear, and body); YOUNG,
supra note 3 (discussing seven blind mice touching leg, trunk, tusk, head, ear, tail, and entire
elephant); QUIGLEY, supra note 2 (discussing six blind men feeling side, trunk, tusk, leg, ear,
tail, and side).
5. QuIG.LEY, supra note 2, at24; see also Glenn v. State, 511 A.2d 1110, 1121 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1986) (using parable to say that one should not assume that whole resembles part
with which one is familiar); YOUNG, supra note 3, at 34 ("The Mouse Moral: Knowing in part
may make a fine tale, but wisdom comes from seeing the whole."). Occasionally, the story is
told with the moral implicit. See LEACH, supra note 4, at 54 (ending one page version simply
with challenging question, "Would anyone answer 'Elephant'?").
6. A Westlaw search yields more than one hundred and fifty law review articles and
judicial opinions that cite the parable (results available on file with author). Some subjects,
such as the OJ. Simpson murder trial and the Internet are repeatedly compared to the parable.
See C. Keith Wingate, The O.J Simpson Trial: Seeing theElephant, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
121, 122 (1995) (comparing different views toward 0.. Simpson trial to blind men viewing
elephant); see also Symposium, Internet Entrepreneurs, New Traffc Patterns, and Policy
Issues, 3 B.U. 3. Sc. & TECH. L. 1, 9 (1997), athttp'J/www.bu.edu/1aw/scitech ("When we look
at the Intemet, one of the things that concerns me is that it is a term that we use without any
consensus as to what it means. I talk to people in virtually every industry and I get completely
different images. It is like the three blind men and the elephant"). For a similar discussion, see
Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Children's Rights vs. Adult Free Speech: Can They Be Reconciled?, 29
CONN. L. REv. 893, 894 (1997).
7. See Elder v. Holloway, 984 F.2d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(stating that panel errs like blind men by relying on one paragraph of another case in isolation);
Gore, supra note 4, at 645 (discussing how individual disasters that form greater global crisis
are like parts of elephant); Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485,
1485 (1994) (comparing parable to federalism because federalism is too big to grasp in its
entirety). Professor Koh used the parable three years in a row in three different articles. See
Harold Hongju Koh, Ten Lessons About Appellate Oral Argument, 71 CONN. B.J. 218, 221
(1997) [hereinafter Koh I] (comparing ideal moot court panel positively to blind men); Harold
Hongju Koh, The 1998 FrankelLecture: BringingInternationalLaw Home, 35 Hous. L. REV.
623, 635 (1998) [hereinafter Koh II] (stating that international law theorists each see only part
of international law like blind men); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE LJ. 2599, 2603-04 (1997) [hereinafter Koh III] (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES
&ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPILANCEWITHINERNATIONAL
REGULATORYAGREEMENTS (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)).
8. See, e.g., Application of Lustig, 368 F.2d 1019, 1022 (C.C.PA. 1966) (Smith, 3.,
dissenting) (stating that persons not looking at entire design are blind men); Application of
Rainer, 347 F.2d 574, 575 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (Smith, 3., dissenting) (stating that two parties find-
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the vast majority have no inkling that the simple tale they have appropriated
has ancient roots in Eastern religion, they rarely recognize its epistemic
implications or that their applications of the modem version turn the ancient
parable's moral on its head.
Part II, therefore, begins by briefly tracing the origins of the blind men
and the elephant parable to ancient South Asia and perhaps back to the Bud-
dha himself. In the South Asian religions in which the parable arose, the
story's moral endorsed perspectivism and proclaimed the ungraspable nature
of truth. Agreeing that a search for ultimate answers to theoretical questions
is futile, Buddha advocated a "middle way" to personal enlightenment: a spir-
itual journey that requires letting go of all attachments, including self-aggran-
dizing intellectual views. Part I then contrasts this world view with the
implicit model held by the many modern legal scholars who employ the para-
ble unselfconsciously: in their minds, the parable serves merely as a rhetori-
cal flourish. In these modern contexts, the parable's meaning now reflects not
the Eastern attitude toward truth but rather Western philosophical beliefs
about the ultimate triumph of logic and dialectic analysis. Part II goes on to
explore why the meaning of the parable has changed and suggests why uncon-
sciously adopted epistemic beliefs are detrimental to scholarly endeavors.
Part LI explores the small group of legal theorists who have consciously
invoked the parable because of its epistemic content. Interestingly, the para-
ble's moral changes here too, chameleon-like, depending on each writer's now
explicit epistemological arguments. Although this group includes scholars
who have tried to integrate the original Eastern moral into Western legal
contexts, Part Hm does not put forth one "correct" use of the parable. Instead,
it merely explores how one's epistemic beliefs generally impact legal scholar-
ship, whether it be a nihilist's tendency to "trash" other work or a pragmatist's
effort to balance perspectivism with a continued search for a grounding of
moral values. Second, Part I observes how well this parable acts as a mirror
of each writer's epistemic beliefs.
This last observation leads to Part IV, which explores the blind men and
the elephant parable more broadly as a rhetorical device. Rather than seeing
parables, metaphors, and other tropes as mere rhetorical flourishes, Part IV
ing support for different things in same document are like blind men); Phiip Soper, Dworkin's
Domain Law's, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1166, 1172 (1987) (reviewing RONALD DWOKION, LAW'S
EMPIRE (1986)) [hereinafter Soper 1] (comparing legal theorists who attempt to define "law" to
blind men); Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Problem ofDefinition, 50 U. CIE L. REV. 1170,
1185 (1983) (reviewing JoNENFNNL,NATURALLAWANDNATuRALRIGHTS (1980)) [hereinafter
Soper 11] (same). One Texas court used the parable in three cases involving the same legal
issue. See Ned v. State, 652 S.W.2d 404,405 (Tex Crim. App. 1983) (determining whether
jury must be told what constitutes "in the course of committing theft"); Olveda v. State, 650
S.W.2d 408,411 n.* (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Teague, 3., dissenting) (same); Rohlfing v. State,
612 S.W.2d 598,602 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (same).
960
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contends that legal scholars should recognize that their work is as much about
persuasion as about elucidation. Thus, examining a scholar's rhetorical choices
can be a tool for deconstructing that scholar's implicit beliefs and, more
broadly, for understanding the underlying rhetorical structure of legal dis-
course. Part IV also uses the blind men and the elephant parable's ubiquitous
appearance across a wide range of legal writing as an entry into the debate
provoked by the perspectivism of outsider scholarship and post-modem skepti-
cismto the previously self-enclosed world of law and legal scholarship. Here,
the Article suggests that rhetorical theory might provide a more rational basis
for evaluating legal scholarship in the post-modem era.
The Conclusion turns more forcefully to advocacy. First, recognizing
that the rhetorical structure of legal scholarship actively discourages an
investigation of epistenric premises, the Conclusion urges legal writers to
consider more carefully the epistemic implications of their arguments, even
when their subject matter seems far afield from heady philosophical concerns.
Second, the Conclusion suggests that writers also carefully examine their
rhetoric because unexamined metaphors and parables may in fact reveal more
about their agenda than they realize and because of the unique ability of
rhetorical tropes to spur greater creative thinking. In this way, the Conclusion
argues that legal writers will be better able to find their true epistemic voice:
a voice that honestly appraises their claims about the relation of their work to
truth without sounding arrogant, overly hopeful, or, at the other extreme,
uncharacteristically insecure. In other words, the Conclusion urges that
regardless of one's epistemic or political beliefs, the Buddha's advice - to
seek a middle way between intellectual arrogance and the despair of
nihilism - still has relevance for the enterprise of legal scholars today.
ff. The Parable as Epistemic Mirror
A. The Original Parable and the Eastern View of Truth
The blind men and the elephant parable originated in South Asia at least
two thousand years ago.9 Given its ancient lineage, slightly different versions
are preserved in different locales and religious traditions. My personal
favorite is in Edmund Berkeley's Ride the East Wind: Parables of Yesterday
and Today, entitled "The Six Blind Men of Nepal."'" According to this tale,
9. If the parable's origin is in Buddhism, it dates back to Buddha's lifetime of approxi-
mately 563-483 B.C. See KENNETH KS. CH'BN, BUDDHISM THE LIGMT OF ASIA 14 (1968)
(estimating dates of Buddha's life). If Jainism is the source, the parable may go back to as early
as 2500 B.C. See David F. Chavkin, Fuzzy Thinking:. A Borrowed Paradigm for Crisper Law-
yering, 4 CIUNIcAL L. REv. 163, 194 n.8 (1997) (estimating origin of parable to be in Jainism).
10. Edmund C. Berkeley, The Six BlindMen ofNepal, in RIDE THE EAST WIND: PARA-
BLES OF YESTERDAY AND TODAY (Edmund C. Berkeley ed., 1973).
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in the Nepalese highlands 'there lived six blind men who had heard many
conflicting stories about a great beast called the elephant. And this led to
many heated arguments among them."11 To resolve their disputes, they went
down to the lowlands and engaged "the help of a rather casual and careless
guide who could see."' 2 A sleeping elephant was found and each blind man
touched the elephant for a minute or two "until the elephant waked up and
trumpeted, whereupon they all fled."' 3 Back home, their journey provoked
even more disagreements, as their individual observations led to the familiar
misconceptions. 4 However, unlike the ending of the Western versions, the
Nepalese blind men never come to a full understanding of the beast.'5 Instead,
they resolve their dispute by agreeing that while an animal could perhaps have
some of these qualities, the men "could not possibly conceive of an animal
that had all these qualities."' 6 Thus, they concluded that the elephant was a
legend like a unicorn and the noise they heard a mere 'Jungle illusion.
17
Moreover, they agreed to "forbid all discussion of the elephant - to avoid the
arguments, the friction, and the waste of time."' s
Although Berkeley's version appears to have been adapted from the texts
of the ancient South Asian religion of Jainism, he appears to have misunder-
stood a central tenet of this religion.' 9 The guiding principle of Jainism is
an6kanta, which holds that reality should be "looked at from various points
ofiew."' ° To assert one's own point of view as the truth is ekanta or dogma-
tism.21 Thus, intellectual and social tolerance is "the spirit of an6kanta."'
Jans use the parable of the blind men and the elephant to humbly remind us
of our perceptual limitations.' Jains believe that with regard to theoretical or







18. Id. at 117. Clearly, even a cursory review of any recent volume of the major law
reviews reveals that legal scholars have not chosen the solution favored by the blind men of
Nepal.
19. See T.G. KALGHATG , JAINA LOGIC 15 (1981) (discussing Jaina view that different
viewpoints are needed to attain fuller knowledge). Berkeley's misconception is the typical
Western confusion with the Eastern idea that members of a group each can see the truth differ-
ently but feel no collective need either to ignore these differences orto resolve them.
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metaphysical truths, we are all blind, and Jainism makes no promise that such
truths are discoverable through analytic reasoning.24 In fact, dogmatism is
seen to arise precisely from "discursive thought" and "intellectual discrimina-
tion."' Jamism, however, is not against intellectual inquiry. Rather, the goal
of Jainist practice is to adopt a rational and objective point of view that "looks
at other view points with understanding and sympathy" and to see that "con-
flicting and diverse theories of realities [deserve] equal respect."26 This is not
to say that Jains would, like the blind men in Berkeley's tale, simply throw
their hands up when confronted with divergent points of view. Rather,
synthesis is clearly a worthy Jainist goal so long as the impossibility of one
observer making an absolute statement is recognized.'
Although the parable probably originated in Jainism, the similar Buddhist
version has achieved much more widespread acceptance, in part because its
telling is attributed to the Buddha himself.2 In this version, various monks
and priests of different sects fell to quarreling about spiritual matters such as
the afterlife and the existence of the soul. Their controversy was presented to
Buddha, whose response was to tell the parable as follows: A king has all the
persons in his kingdom, blind from birth, gathered together. Each one is
directed to feel a different part of the elephant and then give a description.
Disagreeing, the blind men began to fight. Witnessing this, the king is said to
be delighted. Buddha then pronounces that like the blind men in the parable,
the disputing monks "don't know what is beneficial and what is harmful [nor
do they know] what is the Dhamma [(truth)] or what is [not.]"' However,
rather than resolve which monks were correct, Buddha's insight is to proclaim
that "[s]ome of these so-called priests & contemplatives are attached. They
quarrel & fight - people seeing only one side."
30
24. Id. at 17.
25. Id. at 13.
26. Id. at 14.
27. Id. at 68. Jaina texts suggest that one should first study each point of view (Nayavada)
and then attempt a synthesis "designed to harmonize the different view-points arrived at by
Nayavada." Id. at 15. Jaina scholars have compared their philosophy as akin to Bertrand Rus-
sell's "doctrine of perspectives" and AN. Whitehead's theory of "coherence." See id. at 66-67.
28. See EUGENWATSoNBURLINGAME, BUDDBIST PARABIES 75-77(1922). TheUdana
is the third book of the Khuddaka Nikaya, a collection of short stories (suttas), each of which is
followed by a short verse attributed to Buddha. The blind men and the elephant parable is found
at Tittha Sutta (Ud. VI4) and titled Various Sectarians. The Udana is part of a larger collection
of texts in the Pali language, called the Pall Canon ("Tipitaka"), which is the foundation for
Theravada Buddhism. See, e.g., http'/Avww.accesstoinsightorg/anonfmdex.html (last visited
March 10, 2001).
29. See Titiha Sulfa, in UDANA VL4, at http'//www.accesstoinsightorg/canon/khuddaka/
udana/ud6-4.html (last visited March 10, 2001).
30. Id.
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Thus, like Jains, Buddhists do not believe there are answers to ultimate
questions about religion, metaphysics, or reality. Such a quest is pointless
because no theory can be clearly established and each metaphysician's point
of view "inevitably reflects his variable passions and egoistic demands."'" In
fact, Buddhism has no semantic equivalent for the word "reality."32 To Bud-
dha, the more important issue is the harm done by the monks' attachment to
their individual views, which produces their desire to fight and dispute one
another. In response to schisms and disagreement, Buddha advocated instead
"a willingness to prefer the ends of loving understanding." Buddha did not
purport that such an approach would lead a group to the correct answer, only
to spiritual peace and harmony. Thus, Buddhism focuses not on philosophical
problems in the abstract, but rather on the dangers of attachment to each
person's well-being. Attachment is defined broadly and includes material
things like possessions and "drsti," literally translated as "views," "but inter-
preted to mean opinions, speculations, beliefs, including all sorts of philo-
sophical and religious opinions."" Buddhism offers a way of life, a practical
guide for letting go of these attachments and thereby attaining the psychologi-
cal and spiritual well-being known in Buddhism as enlightenment. This path,
which Buddha called "the middle way," requires, among other things, the
process of "humble self-searching."
34
Buddhism differs from traditional Western epistemology because of its
"ontological nondualism. 3 This means that while Buddhism denies the exis-
tence of a permanent self or reality (like post-modernism), at the same time,
it posits "an existence before and beyond concepts." 36 This "unconditioned
emptiness," however, is neither a concept nor a tangible thing.37 Therefore,
"emptiness" cannot be grasped by the language narrative because it is not part
of the conceptual world.' This does not mean that emptiness is beyond
consciousness, but only that it is beyond conceptual consciousness.39 Bud-
dhists believe that emptiness can "be experienced directly through the practice
of 'mindfulness,' which is the ability to sustain a calm, intense, and steady
focus when one intends to do so.... Mindfulness involves accessing a state
31. THE TEACHINGS OF THE COMPASSIONATE BUDDHA 36 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1955).
32. SANGHARAKSHrA,A GUIDE TO THE BUDDHIST PATH 177 (2d ed. 1996).
33. Id. at 84.
34. Id.
35. John A. PowellMultiple Self Exploring Between andBeyond Modernity and Post-
modernity, 81 MIJNN. L. REv. 1481,1506 (1997) (citing ANNE CAROLYNKLE.I, MEETNG THE
GREAT BLIss QUEEN: BUDDHISTS, FEMINISTS AND THEART OF SELF 140 (1995)).
36. Id. at 1506.
37. I. at 1507.
38. Id,
39. Id.
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of consciousness that is beyond and ungoverned by experience and context.
Thus, much of the Buddhist practice of sitting is directed towards gaining
access to the place that is empty of concepts.
40
The immediate questions for a traditional Western philosopher about this
"place" ofunconditioned emptiness are: What is its nature? Is it unchanging
like the Platonic ideal or unique and transitory for each individual? Unfortu-
nately, even asking these questions brings one "back in the realm of concep-
tual duality and not in the 'unpattemed' space that is free of concepts."41 The
co-existing beliefs that (a) no definitive truths can be drawn from our transi-
tory perceptions of the world, along with (b) a belief in a pre-existing, a-
conceptual unity, are what also distinguishes Buddhist thought from post-
modem perspectivism. While post-modem theory embraces Buddhism's anti-
essentialist language with regard to the self and perception, no Western
theory, pre- or post-modem, has at the same time asserted the seemingly con-
tradictory essentialist concept of a unitary awareness that all persons can learn
to experience temporarily.
42
With the Eastern understanding of the parable clearly set forth, the next
section returns to legal scholarship to explore why so many Western legal
academics are, to use a Buddhist term, so "attached" to a very different moral
for the blind men and the elephant parable.
B. The Parable and the Implicit Essentialism ofLegal Scholarship
1. The Parable in Doctrinal Scholarship and Judicial Opinions
Whether one writes about the tax code or the Constitution, every piece
of scholarship has an epistemic component; that is, the author has an opinion
about the relationship of his work to truth. An author may believe his conclu-
sions reflect the "objective truth," or reflect a personal and partial '"ruth," or
merely posit a tentative hypothesis to be tested by others. In legal scholarship,
however, the author's position on this fundamental issue is usually implicit
and must be teased out of his rhetoric. In this section, I explore how the blind
men and the elephant parable serves as a mechanism for conveying legal
scholars' implicit epistemic beliefs.
To be sure, some of the hundreds of references to the blind men and the
elephant parable in legal literature are either decorative43 or passing efforts to
40. Id. at 1507 (citing KLEIN, supra note 35, at 11).
41. Id.
42. See id. (describing Western conceptions of self).
43. See In re Garza, 981 S.W.2d 438, 442 (Tex- App. 1998) (Rickhoff J., concurring)
(quoting prediction that revised code would end practice of different judges "passing on some
facet of a child's welfare... [like] a blind man touching and describing an elephant;" but
concluding that this case's history belied that prediction (quoting Eugene L. Smith, Texas Family
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be humorous.' Significantly often, however, the parable is referenced in an
article's title,45 used as the organizing paradigm for its introduction or conclu-
sion," or used to anchor an important argument.' Despite the staggering
spectrum of subject matters in these articles, the vast majority of these authors
use the parable to convey just two basic epistemic belief systems - what I
shall call the "arrogant doctrinalist/judicial" model and the "interdisciplinary/
optimist" model.'
In doctrinal scholarship and judicial opinions, the parable is typically
invoked to differentiate and elevate the author's perspective. In its strongest
Code Symposium Supplemen4 Parent and Child, 8 TEX. TECaL.REV. 19,23 (1976))); see also
McSurelyv.Ratlifi282F. Supp. 848,852 (E.D. Ky. 1967) (noting thatAmerican understanding
of Communism is that of blind men viewing elephant). Some judges seem to believe that
multiple (and mixed) metaphors are the sign of a subtle mind. See In re Marriage of Schaffer,
81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797, 801, 802, 804 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (describing family law dispute
using parable and other metaphors and analogies, including impressionist paintings, desert
caravan, T.V. show The Prisoner, child's game of telephone, and lightning bugs and lightning).
44. See Muirhead v. Zucker, 726 F. Supp. 613, 614, 618 (WD. Pa. 1989) (stating that
court "stands here like the proverbial blind man holding the tail of an elephant... [and h]olding
only the tail, it is difficult for use to divine what shape the rest of this beast takes. Nevertheless
we endeavor to hold up our end, so to speak.").
45. See J. William Callison, Blind Men and Elephants: Fiduciary Duties Under the
Revised Uniform Partnership Ac4 Uniform Limited Liability Company Ac4 and Beyond, 1 J.
SALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 109 (1997); Joan M. Krauskopf, Touching the Elephant: Percep-
tions of Gender Issues in Nine Law Schools, 44 J. LEGAL EDUc. 311 (1994); Michael B.
Metzger & Dan R. Dalton, Seeing the Elephant: An Organizational Perspective on Corporate
MoralAgency, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 489 (1996); Beverly I. Moran & Daniel M. Schneider, The
Elephant and the Four BlindMen: The Burger Court and its Federal TaxDecisions, 39 HOw.
L.J. 841 (1996); Paul T. Wangerin, Damages for Reliance Across the Spectrum of Law: Of
BlindMen and Legal Elephants, 72 IOWA L. REV. 47 (1986); Wingate, supra note 6.
46. See J. Thomas Warlick, Jr., Of Blue Light Specials and Gray-Market Goods: The
Perpetuation of the ParallelImportation Controversy, 39 EMoRY L.J. 347,347,409-10 (1990)
(quoting parable in introduction and again in conclusion).
47. Upon closer examination, a surprising number of parable references suggest the par-
able's moral is not a good fit with the author's point. See, e.g., Sharp v. Dep't of Revenue, 945
P.2d 38, 46 (Mont. 1997) (Nelson, 3., dissenting) (arguing that majority's focus on contacts with
state rather than clear statutory criteria on what constitutes taxable intangible income "makes as
much sense as the blind man tying to describe the elephant's trunk by reference to a tree"). The
dissent's essential complaint is that entirely irrelevant criteria were used, not that parts were
mistaken for the whole. Id.; see also United States v. Mallab, 503 F.2d 971,987 (2d Cir. 1974)
(stating that defining scope of narcotics conspiracy is akin to describing elephant from touch);
In re Special Investigation No. 228,458 A.2d 820, 834 n.26 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (stating
that appellate courts should not look at part in context and assume part applies to whole); State
v. Martin, 470 N.W.2d 900,907 n.1 3 (Wis. 1991) (confusing parable with forest/trees metaphor).
While parable "misuse" is distinct from the epistemic concerns discussed in much of this Article,
these examples are relevant to Part IV which advocates a more self-conscious use of rhetorical
devices.
48. See infra Part III.
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form, the author asserts that others who have examined a particular subject
suffer from total or partial "blindness" and, therefore, have failed to properly
see the elephant. The author then dresses his claim to greater vision in the
evocative language of the parable and provides what he purports is a more
accurate model or analysis of his subject49 than either a particular individualso
or a broader array of commentators have provided."
Doctrinal scholars use the parable to criticize others in their field or to
illustrate that practitioners, legislators, or judges lack the perspective to com-
prehend the full complexity of an issue. 2 Harold Koh's 1997 Yale Law
Journal review of two books on international law provides a typical example
of the former.53 Koh first praises the authors, Abram Chayes of Harvard,
Antonia Chayes, President of the Consensus Building Institute, and Thomas
Franck of New York University, agreeing that their models of international
law have some descriptive power.5 4 However, he then declaims, 'Yet both
books, instructive as they are, give shape to only parts of the blind men's
49. See, e.g., Moira T. Roberts, Individual Rights and Government Power in Collision:
A Look atRust v. Sullivan Through the Lens ofPowerAnavsis, 49 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1023,
1033 (1992) (stating that both opponents and proponents ofRust decision are blind men).
50. See, e.g., Donald B. Ayer, Stewardship, 91 MIc L. REV. 2150,2162 (1993) (stating
that Judge Edwards's formulations are partial).
51. See, e.g., Bobby Jimdal,Justiftcation ofJustice: Intuitionism, 59 LA. L. REV. 891,892
(1999) ("Particular societies vary in their distance from the ideal."); Robert M. Lawless et al.,
A Glimpse at Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in SmallFirm Bankruptcies, 1994 U.
ILL. L. REV. 847, 848-49 (1994) ("Thus, like the parable of the blind persons and the elephant,
our perception of the bankruptcy system is partly right but ultimately wrong."); Robert H.
Roether, The Forest for the Trees: JudicialActivism in the Tort Marketplace, 78 Mica B.J.
706, 709 (1999) (comparing critics of contingency fees to blind men). In some cases, the
parable is inverted. The author argues that he sees multiple entities rather than the single entity
disparately described by others. See, e.g., Nancy L. Simmons, Memories and Miracles -
Housing the Rural PoorAlong the United States-Mexico Border: A Comparative Discussion
of Colonia Formation andRemediation in ElPaso Count, Texas, andDoraAna Count, New
Mexico, 27 N-M. L. REV. 33, 34 (1997) (stating that each "colonia" has its own characteristics).
This is how this author originally used the parable in another article. See David M. Zlotnick,
Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia's Fidelity to His Constitutional
Methodology, 48 EMoRY L.J. 1377, 1381 (1999) (citing divergence of legal scholars' analysis
of Scalia); see also infra note 286 (discussing genesis ofArticle).
52. See, e.g., Joe B. Brown, The Sentencing GuidelinesAreReducingDisparity, 29 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 875, 878 (1992) ("The use of statistics that are cut on such an artificial and
arbitrary line produces a result that can be compared to three blind men feeling different parts
of an elephant. . . none of them has a true picture of what the elephant looks like yet each
believes himself to be accurate within his narrow frame of reference."); Benjamin B. Quinones,
Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central City with Resident Control, 27 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 689, 700 (1994) (stating that analysts have different perspectives on HousingAct).
53. See Koh Ill, supra note 7, at 2602 (stating that both books give shape to only part of
blind men's elephant).
54. Id.
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elephant" because both authors "omit ... a thoroughgoing account of the
transnational legal process."" In Koh's view, "this overlooked process...
is pivotal to understanding why nations 'obey' international law, rather than
merely conform their behavior to it when convenient."56 The remainder of the
book review explains and justifies Koh's thesis.' Thus, while polite and
praising of these authors' efforts, the parable's real purpose is to emphasize
that only Koh with his superior insight, rather than the authors ofthe reviewed
books, can articulate a theory that actually explains "why nations obey inter-
national law.""8 Koh's tone, as is common inmost law reviews ofthis stature,
is genteel, and his appraisal of his fellow scholars does not sound abrasive."'
Nevertheless, his conclusion that the Chayes and Franck models fail to include
the "pivotal" concept suggests they are hardly useful models at all. In part, it
is the cuteness and familiarity of the parable itself that serves to balm his
harsh assessment.' ° Thus, the parable serves not only to illustrate the superi-
ority of the author's contribution but to soften the hubris of the assertion.
Judicial opinions that cite the parable generally follow the same para-
digm, although their assessments of the blind are frequently more cutting.
Judges employ the parable to denigrate the "blindness" of the parties,' their
experts,6 2 and their attorneys,63 who are alleged to have missed some critical
55. Id. Koh describes this process as "the complex process of institutional interaction
whereby global norms are not just debated and interpreted, but ultimately internalized by
domestic legal systems." Id. Therefore, both books also "avoid explaining the evolutionary
process whereby repeated compliance gradually becomes habitual obedience." Id. at 2603.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2603-59.
58. Id. The following year, Koh made the same pitch in his Houston Law Review article.
See Koh II supra note 7, at 635.
59. See Daniel Farber, Gresham's Law ofLegal Scholarship, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 307,
311 (1986) (noting that "[w]ith a few refreshing exceptions, one law professor never calls
another a fool" and, therefore, silly ideas often survive entirely too long).
60. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An
Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 807-08 (1993) (stating that use of stories is
not always good idea); Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEo.
L.J. 251,251-52 (1992) (noting that stories and other literary devices are often helpful tojudges
and commentators).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409,1411 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that
parties are blind in that each is only partially correct about Rule 33 interpretation); Walker v.
Harris, 642 F.2d 712, 715 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that parties are blind without good legal
assistance); see Kowalczyk v. Kowalczyk, 1992 WL 884848, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 4,1992)
(stating that parents' "insights into their personal impact on the children had the clarity of two
blind men describing an elephant - their point of view was directly limited to the part of the
problem that touched them").
62. See Walsh v. C.I.R., 1981 WL 10639 (T.C. June29,1981) (describing experts dueling
about how to value reasonable compensation); Hall v. City of West Des Moines, 62 N.W.2d
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aspect of the case,' often arguing that it is advocacy itself which causes the
disability.6" Some judges even turn the parable against their colleagues,'
especially when battling over the interpretation of precedent.67 For example,
734, 737-38 (Iowa 1954) (discussing how three experts used widely different methods of prop-
erty valuation).
63. See S.B. Thomas, Inc. v. Thompson, 689 A.2d 1301, 1308 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1997) (criticizing parties' for using self-serving citations to key precedent); City of Gaylord v.
Beckett, 144 N.W.2d 460,484 (Mich. 1966) (Souris, 3., dissenting) (claiming that "none of the
parties... has included... any analysis of the Act as an integrated whole").
64. See Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 937 F. Supp. 824, 832 (ED. Wis. 1996) (decrying
amount of testing of child with multiple disabilities and stating "that the parents, the educators,
the psychologists, and all the other experts acted at times like the blind man and the elephant');
S. Cal. Edison Co. v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 757, 759 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (resolving financial
claims of parties in wartime just compensation case and finding that although parties claims are
very different, each is partially correct); Anglim v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 1991 WL 113978, at *13
(Mo. Ct. App. June 28, 1991) (Smith, P.J., dissenting) (arguing that doctrinal analysis of forum
non conveniens cases often resembles parable); Menzer v. Village of Elkhart Lake, 186 N.W.2d
290, 292 (Wis. 1971) (stating parties' definitions of statutory term is like parable).
65. See United States v. Patriarca, 807 F. Supp. 165,201 (D. Mass. 1992) (claiming that
government failed to provide its expert witness with important information and expert's
opinions were flawed like "the proverbial blind man who believed that an elephant resembled
a snake because he had only felt its tail"); Fleming v. County of Kane, 686 F. Supp. 1264, 1266
(N.D. IlM. 1988) (stating that parties' versions of facts were so one-sided that court deferred to
jury's verdict); United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. U.S. Postal Ser., 455 F. Supp. 857, 875 (ED. Pa.
1978) (decrying parties' "uncritical" and selective approach to precedent and refusing to be
placed in position of blind man examining elephant); Crawford-Gray v. Nelson, 485 N.W.2d
840, 1992 WL 126819, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 1992) (Sundby, J., dissenting) (deciding
that hearing was required because parties' affidavits were biased and that relying on them would
be like parable); see also Tandy Corp. v. United States, 626 F.2d 1186, 1190 (5th Cir. 1980)
(stating that interpreting debenture indenture requires looking at whole elephant); Application
of Rainer, 347 F.2d 574, 575 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (comparing attorneys who did not clearly define
what an invention is to blind men in parable); Transairco, Inc. v. United States, 366 F. Supp.
602, 604 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (comparing plaintiffs and defendant to blind men when analysis of
mechanical device led to radically different conclusions).
66. In this context, the parable shows up in split decisions, with the parable users claiming
that the dissent or majority has erred in some specific regard. See Davies v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 715 F.2d 435,439 (9th Cir. 1983) (Duniway, 3., dissenting) (stating that majority fails
to pay attention to critical parts of trial record); McAuley v. Wills, 303 S.E.2d 258, 261 (Ga.
1983) (Weltner, J., dissenting) (arguing concepts of proximate cause, comparative negligence,
contributory negligence, last clear chance, etc. are all "but differing aspects of the same
inquiry - causation - so that their expositors seem uncomfortably akin to the fabled blind men
describing in varying terms the same elephant"); see also Gulyer v. United States, 314 F.2d 506,
509 (Ct. CI. 1963) (stating that different interpretations of contract were result of blind men
(parties and lower courts) looking at part of elephant (contract)); Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d
683, 691 (Tex. 1987) (Spears, 3., dissenting) (criticizing majority's instruction on damages for
mental anguish because instruction allows jury to award different damages for same injury).
67. See Wilson v. County Ct, 148 S.El2d 353, 362 (W. Va. 1966) (Browning, J., dis-
senting) (using parable to highlight majority's failure to "look to any other applicable statutory
or constitutional provision"); see also Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry., 138 F.3d 635,645 (7th Cir. 1997) (Wood, I., dissenting) (noting that case calls
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in a dissent later vindicated by the Supreme Court, Judge Kozinski wrote, 'We
are told that the blind man, when handed the elephant's tail, concluded that
the creature looked like a rope. So does the panel err in building a whole
theory of qualified immunity law on a paragraph dangling at the end of [a
prior decision]."a
Clearly, time and cultural transplantation have dramatically changed the
epistemic import of the original version. First, among doctrinal scholars and
judges, there is now an implicit assumption that the "elephant" (i.e., the truth
about an area of law or a case) is out there, waiting to be deduced through
proper analysis. Second, blindness is now a metaphor for the intellectual
shortsightedness that afflicts others, rather than an element of the human con-
dition.69 Third, Eastern perspectivism is rejected, and '"tings" can only have
a single meaning, not multiple ones." Thus, what started out as a reminder of
the limits of the human condition has now become, no matter how gently or
humorously put, a tool for the intellectually arrogant to express their superior-
ity. The question is why this meaning, rather than the original moral, has such
appeal to legal scholars and judges?
Perhaps for judges, it is something inherent in their position. While a
debated point in academic circles, a court's public function is to discover "the
truth" in each case." Moreover, because live cases deal more with facts than
for all interested parties to be joined in one action where there is jurisdictional dispute over
work assignments, thus avoiding approaching case like the blind men in the parable); TEC &
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Falkner, 827 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992) (Mayfield,
J., dissenting) (stating that different interpretations of what qualifies as appealable order in
workers' compensation cases resembles blind men and elephant parable).
68. Elder v. Holloway, 984 F.2d 991,994 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see
Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994) (reversing panel's decision); see also NLRB v.
Creative Food Design Ltd., 852 F.2d 1295, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that "[like the blind
man with the elephant, our [dissenting] colleague lays hand on a few isolated quotes and
pronouncements about the importance of turnover, yet each of these addresses situations
radically different from the one this case presents"); Skinner v. Mahomet Seymour Sch. Dist
No. 3, 413 N.E2d 507, 510 (M. App. Ct. 1980) (using parable to describe dissent's selective
use of quotes and claiming that dissent has created "a whole new creature").
69. See Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the
Reconfiguration ofAmerican LegalDiscourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 229,268 (1994) (stating
that men use visual culture to keep women down); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction From the
Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the Logic of Imagination, 70 TEX. L. REV. 109, 173
nO00 (1991) (explaining author's intentional use of visual metaphor and addressing criticism
that 'Western logic is too rooted in the visual"); Steven L. Winter, BullDurham and the Uses
of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639 (1990) (discussing views of Stanley Fish).
70. See La. Paving Co. v. St. Charles Parish Pub. Sch., 604 So. 2d 593,599 (La. Ct. App.
1992) (using parable to assert that contract could be interpreted in only one way when state
wanted to classify it two ways for tax purposes).
71. See Robert Paul, Arizona v. Fulminante: TheApplication ofHarmlessErrorAnatysis
toAdmission ofa Coerced Confession in Violation ofthe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendmen4 94 W. VA. L. REV. 1061, 1080-81 (1992) (discussing how commentators of
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with theory, judicial judgment about the truth of one party's testimony and
evidence versus another's seems more palatable than assertions about the
accuracy of doctrinal models. Regardless of the theoretical critique of the
truth-finding function of judicial proceedings,72 judges at the trial and appel-
late levels are required by institutional culture to justify their real-life deci-
sions and at least cloak their decisions in apolitical reason. This functional
difference, combined with the aura of invincibility of those cloaked in black
robes, is probably sufficient to explain the allure of this version of the parable
for judicial writers.
For scholarly writers, the answer seems more complicated and more
interesting. Unlike judicial proceedings, there is no requirement that one
theoretical model be correct and the others wrong. Certainly, one vein of the
scholarly ideal is exactly the opposite - one of open-minded rationality rather
than partisanship.7" Perhaps for legal academics it is our adversarial training
that lends itself to choosing metaphors that negate the position of our oppo-
nents, whether in court or inthe pages of law journals. Others have suggested
that the competitiveness and grandiosity of much of legal scholarship is a
function of either the article selection process or tenure and promotion stan-
dards. For example, Daniel Farber argues that law journal selection process
is biased in "favor of brilliant, 'paradigm-shifting' work" to the detriment of
mere thoughtfflness. 4 He also believes this leads to adverse selection, with
startling and novel ideas driving out the true but trite.
75
Kenneth Lasson concurs that legal scholarship has seen an unwarranted
proliferation of claims of theoretical breakthroughs. However, he blames not
the inexperience of law review editors but the standards for promotion and
tenure set forth in most law faculty handbooks. For purposes of promotion
and tenure, most faculties require that scholarship must be "'analytical,'
Fulminante decision are examining same case but express radically different opinions of its
outcome).
72. Midan Damaska, Truth in Adjudication, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 289, 302 (1998) (using
parable to frame the debate about truth-seeking function of trials); see also Myma S. Raeder,
The Better Way: The Role of Batterers' Profiles and Expert "Social Framework" Back-
ground in Cases ImplicatingDomesic Violence, 68 U. CoLO. L. REv. 147,174 (1997) (recog-
nizing that trial is only partly an objective search for truth and using parable to describe
batterer's profiles).
73. On the other hand, some argue that legal scholarship's predominant mode is to mimic
the argumentation style of a legal brief or judicial opinion. More specifically, the body of the
article is a more elaborate and somewhat detached judicial opinion in waiting and the conclu-
sion is the lawyer's prayer for relief. See Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of
Legal Scholarship, 86 MiCL L. REV. 1835,1847-50 (1988) (stating that legal scholarship gives
opinion as to how judges should decide cases); infra notes 254-61 and accompanying text.
74. DanielA. Farber, The CaseAgainstBrilliance, 70 MINN. L. REv. 917,917 (1986).
75. Farber, supra note 59, at 308.
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'learned, significant,' 'well-written,' and 'disinterested."' 76 Given these open
ended criteria, Lasson contends that scholars feel pressure to write lengthy,
arcane, heavily footnoted articles, most of which are mediocre. 7 With the
pressure to construct models that re-conceptualize well-trod areas of law in
order to establish their uniqueness and expertise to the tenure and promotion
committee, the blind men and the elephant parable becomes a perfect rhetori-
cal trope to emphasize the alleged importance of an author's contribution to
the field. Nor, given the increase in the number and size of law schools over
the past twenty-five years (and hence the number of faculty writing articles), 78
should it come as a surprise that the percentage of articles that attempt grand
theoretical or doctrinal synthesis has increased.79
On the other hand, it may be that legal scholars are participating, no more
and no less, in a decidedly Western approach to intellectual inquiry. Cer-
tainly, other Western academic disciplines also use the parable in a similar
manner.8 In both modem legal and rhetorical theory, critics contend that,
dating back to Plato and Aristotle, Western thinkers have presumed that there
is "one true reality that can be discovered and defined through dialectical
argumentation."81 This epistemology, known as essentialism or foundation-
alism, goes hand in hand with another defining aspect of Western thinking -
"omnipresent dualisms," such as right/left, faith/reason, religious/secular,
etc.82 Essentialism's legal equivalent Langdellian formalism, shares this core
76. Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure,
103 HARV. L. REV. 926,935 (1990).
77. See id. at 927. Nor are their fears unfounded. Lasson notes that a professor was
turned down for promotion because the committee felt his work "'did not disprove an accepted
understanding of what the law is or how it works."' Id. at 941.
78. Michael . Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap AmongLaw, Law Practice and Legal
Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30
SUbFOLKU. L. REV. 353,373 (1996).
79. See Lasson, supra note 76, at 941 (citing tenure requirements as reason for increased
volume of articles).
80. See Marvin Mudrick, The BlindMen and the Elephant, 30 HUDsON REV. 426 (1977)
(reviewing AFRD DAVID, THE STRUMPETMUSE (1977); JOHNGARDNER, THELIFEAND TIMEs
oFCHAUCER(1977); JoHN GARDNER, THEPOETRYOF CHAUCER(1977);DONALDR. HOWARD,
THE IDEA OF THE CANTERBURY TALES (1976)) (comparing authors to blind men who disagree
over and misunderstand Chaucer); William C. Spengemann, Three BlindMen and an Elephant:
The Problem of Nineteenth-Century English, 14 NEW LITERARY HIST. 155, 155-71 (1982)
(asserting that analysis of nineteenth-century English literature should not be broken into
Romantic, Victorian, and American because literary works do not fit easily into categories, and
defining these terms confuses study of nineteenth-century literature).
81. MARKLAwRENCEMcPHAIL,ZENINTHEARTOFRHETOlIC59(1996);seeDanielC.K
Chow, TrashingNihilism, 65 TUL. L. REV. 221,264-65 (1990) (claiming that many nihilists and
legal realists actually espouse positions that suggest there is objective truth "out there").
82. AndrewHuxley, Golden Yoke, Silken Text, 106 YALEL.J. 1885,1896 (1997) (review-
ing REBECCA REDWOOD FRENC, THE GoLDENYOKE: TELEGAL COSMOLOGY OF BUDDHIST
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"faith that legal concepts are tied to nature and logic in a way that can produce
uncontroversial right answers to legal questions "s3 and its concomitant dual-
isms, such as guilty/not guilty, law/morality, and of course, true/false. Just as
importantly, critics argue that legal academics generally adopt an essentialist
outlook by default. Thus, scholarship is written within "a rhetorical hierarchy
that channels inquiry away from the ontological to the epistermic, away from
the epistemic to the normative, and away from the normative to the tech-
nical."8 4 With the exception of the few who write in the ratified air of legal
theory, this hierarchy allows the majority of legal scholars who toil in policy
and doctrinal debates (i.e., the normative and technical domains) never to have
to consider the epistemic assumptions that underlie their work. Thus, it is not
surprising that many Western legal scholars write as if they believe they have
discovered the truth and that those with whom they disagree are wrong in
some absolute sense.
However, the important insight here is not that legal academics tend to
share in Western essentialist assumptions. Rather, this Article is concerned
with the cost to legal scholarship of adopting epistemological beliefs by default
rather than by choice. 5 First, an unreflective essentialism may add to legal
TIBET (1995)). Both McPhail and Charles Paine have suggested that many radical critics
commit the same error by conceptualizing ultimate goals and adopting rigid political positions.
Therefore, they "participate in the same essentialist discourse that they attempt to overthrow,
without recognizing - or acknowledging - that they, in fact, are simply 'changing the cur-
rency.'" McPHAIL, supra note 81, at 36; see Winter, supra note 69, at 652 (claiming that Stan-
ley Fish's argument would fail without apparatus of objectivist rationality).
83. Eric Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 523, 525 (1996). The modem defenders of a more sophisticated kind of neo-formalism
still insist that purpose of scholarship "is to discover and communicate the truth." Daniel A.
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitr" Yurasov: Further Reflections on
Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647, 650 (1994) (insisting that it is duty of scholars
to discover and communicate truth). Exactly what the neo-formalists mean by truth, however,
is less clear than the purist Langdellians. See Daniel Farber, Missing the "Play ofIntelligence,"
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 170 (1994) (arguing that scholar's client is truth "with a small
't,' though [Farber] cheerfully admits [his] inability to define that term").
84. Pierre Schlag, HidingtheBall, 71 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1681,1685 (1996).
85. See infra Part I and accompanying notes 109-214. One can still find isolated exam-
ples of self-conscious yet traditional essentialism. In his article, Speaking the Truth, Judge Eric
Bruggink strikes out against post-modem academia's assault on truth, and he attributes many
of our culture's ills to a "crisis of truth." Eric Bruggink, Speaking the Truth, 34(3) PROCURE-
MENT LAW. 1 (1999). Bruggink asserts that while discovering the truth may often be difficult
this does not mean that "there is not, in fact, an objective truth to be discovered." Id. at 28.
Although he correctly notes that the moral of the story of the "five blind Hindu fakirs and the
elephant" is that "the truth is subjective," he argues this is demonstrably incorrect - "[s]omeone
with two good eyes could give a very accurate description of the elephant" Id. His essentialism
is traditional because he goes on to assert that there are moral truths as well as factual ones. Id.
at 29. However, Bruggink's proposed solution is personal rather than systemic. He asks law-
yers to try to tell the truth in their lives and in their practice for the next month as a method for
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scholarship's tendency toward obfuscation and jargon. According to modem
rhetoricians, the essentialist presumption that reality can be discovered
through reason privileges true knowledge for an academic and philosophical
elite because only they have the time and intelligence to engage in the neces-
sary prolonged study.86 However, the more refined the analysis, the further
it moves away from the language and understanding of even the well-educated
lay person. As a review of pages of many law review volumes reveals, the
refined reason of legal elites has produced discourses so theoretical, complex,
and filled with jargon that it is now beyond the comprehension of most
lawyers and even other law faculty. In other words, irrespective of their
essentialist claims to an accurate representation of reality, their expressions
of those findings have become virtually incomprehensible and therefore of
little use to those who live and work in the practice of law.'
Moreover, the presumption that a single reality exists and can be discov-
ered creates a battle within the elites among their competing models and
theories - a battle of course that no one ever really wins because absolute proof
of a theoretical model, like the disputing monks' religious debates, is forever
beyond proof. This is what Paul de Man ironically calls the "rhetoric of
blindness." Because participants fail to "see the assumptions ofthe opposition
preserving and revitalizing our culture and legal system. Id. at 30. While admirable as a goal,
this article leads to a philosophical dead end, because Bruggink offers no methodology for when
two lawyers' honestly held truths differ. Given the lack of a pure essentialist response to the post-
modem assault on "truth," this one example of self-conscious essentialism has been relegated to
a footnote rather than included in Part Il, which deals with more serious efforts to confront the
perspectivist dilemma. Some might also argue that Justice Scalia's constitutional formalism
comes close to asserting essentialist principles about law. However, upon close analysis, Scalia's
justification for his methodological formalism is not epistemic but pragmatic. He argues that his
methodology is better not because it is "true" in an absolute sense but because it comes the closest
to fulfilling the Constitution's requirement that the judicial branch base its decisions on an
apolitical methodology. See Zlotnick, supra note 51, at 1382 (discussing Scalia's view that
judicial branch should respect political judgments of executive and legislative branches). While
Justice Scalia and many others may actually believe that there are fundamental values that are
morally true, a democracy based on a written constitution luckily does not require the courts to
implement natural law rather only the written text, however problematic that may be.
86. See McPHAiL, supra note 81, at 44 (discussing search for truth in academic world);
John S. Nelson et al., Rhetoric ofInquiry, in THE RBETORIC OF HUMAN SCIENCES: LANGUAGE
AND ARGLENT IN ScHoLARsHip AND PUBuc AFFAIRS 3, 6 (John S. Nelson et al. eds., 1987)
[hereinafter THE RHETORIC OF HUMAN SCiENCES] (discussing evolution of attitudes toward rhet-
oric).
87. Of course, much of post-modem scholarship is also guilty of creating a new and
impenetrable language. Modem rhetoricians, however, suggest that as much as some post-
modernists have tried to escape from Western epistemology, by defining themselves as in op-
position to the formalists, they have unconsciously fallen back into a dualistic mode of thinking.
McPhail, among others, has argued for a rhetoric of coherence and transformation to move
beyond this conundrum. See McPHAIL, supra note 81; see also Ayer, supra note 50, at 2162
(citing need to strengthen law school teaching relevant to practicing law).
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inherent in [their] own positions," there is actually a tacit "agreement to dis-
agree" and "to take positions that are assumed to be mutually exclusive and
essentially at odds with one another" so long of course as all participants
remain committed to the underlying foundationalist outlook.' Thus, by silent
invocation of essentialist assumptions, all too often doctrinal scholarship
becomes enmeshed in the creation and advocacy of endlessly competing
models that all purport to describe the whole truth. What may thereby be lost
in the process is the opportunity to highlight each author's partial insights and
greater efforts to synthesize or harmonize conflicting theories.s" This is
unfortunate because with some reflection (and off the record), many legal
scholars might admit that their actual ontological claims are actually quite
moderate, along the lines of: "Here is a helpful, edifying insight/model, which
in fact, I, the writer, believe does capture an important part ofthe truth. How-
ever, I am not asserting that my model has a monopoly on the truth or that the
other models are without their own merit." But, because of our epistemic
heritage, scholars too often unreflectively choose the most arrogant epistemic
rhetoric, such as the strong essentialist version of the blind men and the ele-
phant parable."
2. The Blind Men Parable as Seen by Interdisciplinary Scholars
and Other Optimists
While the arrogance of doctrinal use of the parable is a clear throwback
to Langdelian formalism, the other dominant rhetorical use of the blind men
and the elephant parable in legal writing appears at first glance to be much
more modest. Chastened by the post-modem critique, this second group of
writers generally begins by noting the difficulty in understanding their particu-
88. MCPHAIL, supra note 81, at 59 (quoting Paul de Man, The Rhetoric ofBlindness, in
BImNEssAINSIGrT: ESSAYSINTHERHETORICOFCONTmaPORARYCRICISM(1 983)); see
also infra notes 272-75 and accompanying text (discussing impact of outsider scholarship's chal-
lenge to this tacit agreement).
89. Ruth Gavison makes the same point in her review of two books, one about positivism
and the other about natural law. Ruth Gavison, Natural Law, Positivism, and the Limits of
Jurisprudence: AModernRound,91 YALE L.J. 1250,1285 (1982) (reviewing JOSEPHRAZ, THE
AuTHORrrY OF LAW: ESSAYS IN LAW AND MoRA=.4n (1979)). While these philosophies are
usually portrayed as opposites, Gavison attempts to stress the agreement between these authors
and justifies this focus by noting that "[t]oo much in the history of legal thought has been lost
by granting primacy to debates and polemics." Id. Gavison then invokes the parable to support
this point by noting that, "[1]ike the six blind men, we try again and again to describe an ele-
phant, forever finding that we fail by emphasizing just one aspect, by illuminating one element
while obscuring others." Id.
90. In these instances, discussed more fully in Part IV, the writer's unreflective rhetorical
choices weaken the article because their rhetoric makes unnecessary and overblown epistemic
assertions.
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lar elephant; this is often because of the complexity or novelty of the subject
matter.91 In addition, they more generously credit those with divergent views
on the subject with access to partial truth.' However, in a variety of ways,
these writers hold unexamined epistemic assumptions that are still traditionally
Western.
In the first instance, some of this apparent modesty is compromised by
the author's assertion that his contribution is critical to the creation of a
unifying theory that will deliver the whole truth in the not too distant future.
For example, Samuel Donnelly argues that in rejecting formalism, Ronald
Dworkin, the post-modernists, Judge Posner, and the other participants in the
modem jurisprudential debates all have contributed to the beginning of a
"recovery of the person" in the law.93 Donnelly's thesis is that with a fully
developed "personalist" jurisprudential theory, of which he is, not surpris-
ingly, a proponent, "we will gradually be able to discern the outline of the
elephant as we explore various portions ofthe body."' Other authors believe
that their unique contribution is the very recognition that seemingly contradic-
91. See Michael Unger, Statement at Press Conference, Eden Roc Americana Resor4
MiamiBeach, Florida (Mar. 7,1985), in INSURANCE PRODUCTS UNDER THE SECURIInS LAWS
257 (Practising Law Institute ed., 1985) ("We don't know how many financial planners are in
business today. Right now, we're in the same position as the proverbial blind men trying to
describe the elephant"); Franklin Pierce Law Center's Fifth Biennial Patent System Major
Problems Conference: IV Prior UserRights, 36 IDEA 406,407-08 (1996) (comparing manner
in which any one person can understand complex subject of prior user rights to blind men's
individual understanding of elephant); Wayne S. Hyatt & Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, The Identiy
Crisis of Community Associations: In Search of the Appropriate Analogy, 27 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. 3. 589, 591 (1993) (comparing classification of community associations to par-
able); James F. Short, Jr., Trace Substances, Science, & Law: Perspectives from the Social
Sciences, 5 RISK 319,320 (1994) (comparing his view as outsider looking at technological and
scientific field of trae elements to impressions of blind men feeling elephant); see also Miss.
Chem. Corp. v. United States, 431 F.2d 1320, 1326-27, 1335-36 (5th Cir. 1970) (Godbold, J.,
dissenting) (noting field of cooperative corporation law is new and needs new framework; while
most judges do not see elephant, this judge does).
92. See, e.g., William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 Onlo ST. J. ON
Disp. REsOL 367,375 (1999) (noting how lawyers approach settlement differently); Paul, supra
note 71, at 1080-81 (noting different approaches of scholars to Fulminante decision); Catherine
3. Ross, The Failure ofFragmentation: The Promise ofa System of Uni~fedFamily Courts, 33
REV. JU1. U.I.P.R. 311, 319 (1999) (comparing those attempting to define "unified family
court" to blind men); 3. Thomas Warlick IV, OfBlue Light Specials and Gray-Market Goods:
The Perpetuation of the Parallel Importation Controversy, 39 EMoRY L.J. 347, 347-48 (1990)
(noting different approaches to gray-market problem).
93. Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Towards a Personalist Jurisprudence: Basic Insights and
Concepts, 28 LOY. LA L. REV. 547,568-71 (1995).
94. Id. at 571; see also Owen D. Jones, Law andBiology: Toward an Integrated Model
ofHumanBehavior, 8 J. CoNTEMP. LEGALIssu.Es 167,167 (1997) (noting thatintegrated model
of human behavior that taps numerous disciplines would benefit legal system in many ways).
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tory or limited positions are ultimately reconcilable parts of a whole, even if
they are not able to propose a unifying definition.95 For example, Paul
Wangerin uses the parable as the organizing metaphor in his article, Damages
for Reliance Across the Spectrum of Law: Of Blind Men and Legal Ele-
phants.' He first demonstrates that five substantive areas of the law - con-
tracts, agency, torts, insurance, and constructive trusts - each have different
methods for dealing with the problem of relying promisees.' Wangerin then
calls upon scholars in these fields to construct a unified theory to achieve
consistency in this type of case.' In his conclusion, Wangerin refers back to
the parable, claiming that while the traditional story ends with "confusion
rampant," another less well-known version does not conclude until "someone
standing nearby shouts out to them, 'But you're all describing the same
thing.' The blind men gather and talk and "[g]radually they piece together
a picture encompassing all their ideas."'" Similarly, Wangerin urges scholars
to break down the barriers between substantive areas of law and to abandon
seeing only "what they wish to see. "1 1 If this is done, Wangerinis confident
that a unified theory of damages will emerge."°
What differentiates the second paradigm is its choice of epistemic opti-
mism in the face of perspectivism. Although these writers admit to some
vision problems, they see blindness as curable, a condition created by circum-
stances or by specialization that will be overcome with time or by a concerted
effort by a dedicated group to remove their intellectual blinders. This concep-
tion of blindness as a temporary rather than a permanent disability is espe-
95. See Eric T. FreyfogleA Sand CountyAlmanac at 50: Leopold in the New Century,
30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10058,10058-59 (2000) (notingthattwo views of nature are not antagonistic
but simply parts of greater whole); Makua wa Mutus, The Banjul Charter and the Afican
Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. 3. INT'L L. 339, 346
(1995) (noting that Western view of human rights is perceived to be in conflict with traditions
that emphasize group over individual, but that "all the accounts paint a complete picture").
Some authors begin by acknowledging the difficulty of knowing the elephant but then use the
parable to point out that someone else's model is nevertheless a poor tool. In a sense, these
writers are simply saying someone else is even more poor sighted than the rest. See Adam M.
Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky Prescriptions of
Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 362 (1994) (using parable to attack
Stephen Breyer's book on risk management reform).
96. Paul Wangerin, Damages for Reliance Across the Spectrum ofLaw: Of Blind Men
andLegalElephants, 72 IOWA L. REV. 47 (1986).
97. See id. at 48 (describing different reactions to hypothetical fact pattern).
98. Id. at 99.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 99.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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cially typical of interdisciplinary scholars who advocate that legal problems
can only be understood by tapping other disciplines, such as economics,
psychology, and sociology. 3 Rather than simply conclude that legal issues,
texts, or theories are not susceptible to a complete understanding, these writers
exhort all to a greater effort and cooperation, expressing a mixture ofhope and
conviction that their elephant eventually will be comprehended fully if we just
look at enough perspectives."
Even in this more humble fashion, the epistemic meaning of this version
of the parable is still critically different from that of its Eastern origins. To
the interdisciplinarians and other optimists, although we can be partially
blinded by new problems or our specialties, truth is still attainable. This
implicit epistemic system is really just foundationalism that has been bitten
but not overcome by the post-modem critique of modernist epistemology.
While these scholars have abandoned the effort to create a closed Langdeflian
system limited to legal texts, they still hope for ontological deliverance - this
time by a community of disciplines rather than just reliance on the law. A
belief that participation in a religious, political, or intellectual movement will
ultimately yield essentialist truth is still, at its core, a Western ontological
system. Although more commonly recognized in Western religious taditions,
such as Judeo-Christian theology, or as a political ideology, such as Marxism,
these "isms" assert that the ultimate truth, knowing God, or the structuring of
a perfect society, can be achieved if one accepts a specific program or ap-
proach. Thus, although dressed in intellectual tolerance, the desire for salva-
tion from the perspectivist dilemma bends the original parable from an accep-
tance of the multi-variability of truth to a denial that it must always be so.
Arguing that the elephant can be understood if we just incorporate enough
perspectives reassures us that the elephant's contours are knowable. In other
103. For example, Cheryl Hanna argues that in the domestic violence arena, feminists and
social scientists are like the blind men in the parable: "Each discipline not only feels something
different, but also claims to possess what it touches." Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope:
The Crime andPunishment ofDomesfic Violence, 39 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1505,1512(1998).
But, she believes that "[a] discussion of punishment in domestic violence criminal cases presents
an opportunity for feminists, social scientists and researchers from other fields to develop inter-
disciplinary insights into the phenomenon of battering. To do so, however, we each have to
relinquish ownership of the problem." Id. at 1513; see also Herbert Kritizer & Frances Kahn
Zemans, The Shadow ofPuniives: An Unsuccessful Effort to BringIt Into View, 1998 WS. L.
REv. 157, 168 (noting need for information from business leaders, social scientists and lawyers
to understand impact of punitive damages on business).
104. See Finkel, supra note 95, at 362 (noting that specialists provide different perspec-
tives); George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteinians and the End ofJurisprudence, 29 LOY.
LA. L. REV. 545, 547, 569 (1996) (providing new approach to jurisprudence); see also
Wegener v. Anna, 296 N.E.2d 589, 591 (5th Dist. App. CL IMl. 1973) (reversing summary judg-
ment for defendant because plaintiff's exercise of care involves many factors which needed full
trial to properly develop, and court felt like blind man and elephant without trial record).
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words, the interdisciplinarian version of blind men and the elephant still
reifles its subject matter even as these authors concede that no one currently
can see it as ittruly is. Pierre Schlag argues that this use ofthe blind men and
the elephant parable is indicative of the "weak perspectivist gambit" that, in
his view, pervades American legal scholarship."°5
Weak perspectivism provides a rhetorical escape hatch from the self-
inflicted conundrum of positing that a legal problem has an answer but failing
to provide it. In psychological terms, weak perspectivist scholarship can take
the form of compensation. As scholars try to fill their legal elephants with
input from various disciplines, so many contradictory meanings are included
that it becomes a "super-full object" that "one would expect to burst."' "°a
Although many of these efforts seem confident, one critic argues that they are
really not more than "desperate ... performance[s] of the gesture - of the
ascription of legal meaning" prompted by the "ontological vacancy of the
[object].' °7
Having examined the two dominant implicit epistemic models of parable
users and the impact of these systems on their rhetoric, the next section turns
to legal scholarship that deals directly with epistemic questions. Reacting to
the challenge of critical legal studies and other post-modem theoreticians,
American legal scholars have been addressing fundamental questions about
the nature of law.l"a Quite naturally, some of these writers have more self-
consciously employed the blind men and the elephant parable. Interestingly,
105. See Schlag, supra note 84, at 1693. He also agrees that there is little epistemic differ-
ence between foundationalists and these weak perspectivists. In both cases, the "entire enter-
prise of what is called 'legal theory' is generally aimed at a reductionist, integrative essential-
ization of the law." Id. at 1695.
106. Id. at 1704-05.
107. Id. at 1705. What is also interesting is that despite the conciliatory nature oftheir rhet-
oric, some weak perspectivists show a surprising lack of graciousness toward outsider scholars
whose attraction to narrative is founded in part, on a more radical perspectivism. Perhaps,
staying in the Freudian vein, in denial that their quest may be in vain, their sublimated fears that
there is no elephant is projected into their attack on outsider scholarship. See Farber & Sherry,
supra note 83; Tushnet, supra note 60.
108. See ROBERTOM. UNGERLAwiNMoDENSocIETY(1976) (discussing varying devel-
opment of law in different times and places); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979) (discussing development of law in middle ages);
Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J.
1, 4 (1984) (discussing legal implications of nihilism, specifically epistemic and moral compo-
nents of nihilistic claims that "it is impossible to say anything true about the world" and that
"there is no meaningful way to decide how to live a good life"); see also MORTON HORWrTz,
THE TRANSFORMATIONOFAMERICANLAW 1780-1860 (1977) (discussing change of legal rules
over time to subsidize economic development and promote class interests); CATHARINE A.
MAcKiN oN, SEXUALHARASSMENToF WORKiNG WOMEN (1979) (arguing thatlegal system has
both created and helped to enforce subordination of women in workplace).
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however, the next Part shows that each invokes the parable in a manner that
reflects his now explicit views.
LI. The Parable and Self-Conscious Scholarship
A. The Nihilist Version of the Parable
The mother of all self-aware articles that invoke the blind men and the
elephant parable is Pierre Schlag's Hiding the Ball. This article is a wonder-
ful exposition of the post-modern attack on foundationalism.'" To help those
confused bythe jargon of many articles in this vein, Schlag starts atthe begin-
ning, which for lawyers is law school. He draws his title from the typical law
student reaction to the Socratic method. Because traditional law professors
never provide definitive answers to their questions, students come to believe
the professor is hiding something - the "ball." The ball is any authoritative
meaning of the law, whether it be common law doctrine, a particular case or
statute, or especially, the Constitution. Schlag believes that the "hiding the
ball" metaphor "seduces the law student into comforting ontological and epis-
temic presumptions." ' Rather than question whether there is a ball, the
student accepts that there is one and focuses on the serious, meaningful, and
even contradictory things being said about it by lawyers, professors, and
judges. Schlag says this process, begun in law school, "is a pattern that is
repeated over and over in American law and ultimately in legal scholarship as
well.""'
As an example, Schlag explores the various and conflicting meanings
ascribed to the Constitution. Schlag argues that because the Constitution
cannot possibly be all these things at once, 12 scholars routinely turn to the
blind men and elephant parable as part of the weak perspectivist gambit to
alleviate either their angst that the Constitution might be made to mean "just
about anything" or "the fear that the Constitution doesn't mean anything at
109. See Schlag, supra note 84.
110. Id.at'1684.
111. Id. at 1685.
112. Schlag cites scholars who assert that the Constitution is a "text" versus a structural
"charter," that its meaning is dependent on history versus political theory, that it is static or
dynamic, a current dialogue, or a "prophecy for the future." Id. at 1689-92 (citing generally
CHARLS L.BLAK,JR.,STRUCTUREANRELATIONSHIPINCONSTUIIONALLAW(1969); PHP
BOBBIT,CoNsTUnoNALINTERPREATION(1991,RONAIDDWORKN,LA"SEMRE(1986);
JOHNHART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); PAUL
W. KAHN, LEGIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL
THEORY (1992); Akhil Reed Amar & Neal K. KatyalExecutive PrMleges andImmuniies: The
Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARv. L. Rav. 701 (1995); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles
andSomeFirstAmendmentProblems, 47 I1n. L. 1(1971); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of ConsitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959)).
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all. 13 Schlag believes that although the parable is a cautionary tale, "it is
nonetheless a soothing one: Even though the perception of each of the blind
men is partial each still has something to contribute to the understanding of
elephants. We, as spectators, know this because we can see the elephant for
ourselves."' 4 Thus, rather than worry that all the conflicting accounts are
"attributable to a defect in the master referent," the parable reassures legal
actors that the Constitution really does exist."'
Despite my admiration for Schlag's essay, I believe there are limitations
to his analysis of the blind men and the elephant parable in legal scholarship.
First, he fails to note the pure essentialist use of the parable in doctrinal
scholarship and judicial opinions. Thus, Schlag misses the fact that, even
more than the weak perspectivists, doctrinal scholars rely on the parable as a
rhetorical device to reinforce their epistemic assumptions. Nor does it appear
that Schlag was aware of the Jainist and Buddhist roots ofthe parable and its
original epistemic meaning.
16
More fundamentally, Schlag fails either to distinguish or to reconcile his
epistemic view (which verges on but does not entirely embrace nihilism) with
the non-dualism of the Eastern philosophy. I say that Schlag's essay verges
on nihilism because he concludes with the claim that there is a "fundamental
ontological emptiness, not in the penumbra, but at the very core (or cores) of
American law.""' 7 In other words, because constitutional scholars cannot
agree on a singular definition of the Constitutional elephant, he concludes
there can never be one. This position can be understood to mean that there is
no such "thing" as the Constitution, at least in the sense that the Constitution
cannot be compared to a physical object."'
Schlag nevertheless contends that his argument does not mean that the
Constitution does not exist or that there is nothing there. Still, he cannot
specify exactly what this thing is except to describe it as a "super-filled ob-
ject." He argues that he "does not want to say that there is nothing there at
all.""n 9 Thus, although he maintains there is a fundamental emptiness at the
113. Schlag, supra note 84, at 1692.
114. Id. at 1693.
115. Id. at 1696. Schlag continues: "The story of the six blind men and the elephant is a
kind of H.LA Hart for post-modems.... 'There must be a core settled meaning, but there will
be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable nor
obviously ruled out'" Id. (quoting RLA Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,607 (1958)).
116. These oversights are not surprising given that Schlag never discusses a single actual
use of the parable in legal scholarship (apparently, this is how you can write a law review essay
when you are brilliant, tenured, and famous).
117. Schlag, supra note 84, at 1717-18.
118. Private correspondence with Pierre Schlag (on file with author).
119. Id.
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core, it is "not just emptiness. '120 In a sense, Schlag's attempt to describe
something that has content but cannot be compared to a physical object seems
akin to the Buddhist paradox: the existence of an emptiness that is somehow
full and which tolerates a radical perspectivism without losing its unitary
integrity. Ultimately, however, Schlag cannot find words, other than meta-
phors like "super-full object," to describe his object/Constitution which mean-
ingfiflly distinguishes his object from the corporeal ones with which we are
more familiar (like elephants). Thus, although Schlag recognizes how the
weak perspectivists use the parable to reify the unseen elephant, his ultimate
conclusion (however he might fight it with metaphors) is really that something
approaching nihilism is the only honest choice for Western legal theorists.
Nihilism is a distinctly Western response to the radical perspectivism
shared by both Western post-modernism and Eastern philosophy. However,
because nihilism has been ascribed multiple meanings, many pejorative, let
me first outline which definition(s) I am using before continuing. Mark Tush-
net defines legal nihilism as the belief that there are no consistent principles
that unify legal reasoning or the formulation and application of legal rules."z
Thus, nihilismtakes radical perspectivism to its logical conclusion. Joe Singer
argues that nihilism has both an epistemological and a moral component."
Singer describes the moral component as follows:
As atheoryofmorality, nihilism claims thatthere is nomeaningful wayto
decide how to live a good life. Any action may be descrled as right or
wrong, good or bad. Just as there is no objective way to describe any
action, there is no objective way to decide howto act.... Since we can-
not know what to do, it does not matter what we do. 124
The critics of nihilism abhor this moral relativism and contend that
nihilism provides no basis for opposing the major evils of history.1" Because
120. Id.
121. Philip Soper's use of the parable in his review of LAW'S EMPIRE has a nihilistic bent
as well. He writes that disagreements among legal theorists are not the result of looking at
different parts of the phenomenon like the blind men and elephant because "both sides are
already looking at the same thing. Legal theorists disagree, not about the possible 'points of
view,' but about which one, if any, can be said to be the most important in elucidating the
concept of law." Soper lsupra note 8, at 1172.
122. Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public
Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX L. REV. 1307,1340-59 (1979).
123. Singer, supra note 108, at4. Like Tushnet, Singer agrees that, "[a]s a theory ofknowl-
edge, nihilism claims that it is impossible to say anything true about the world.... If one takes
nihilism seriously, it is impossible, or in any event fruitless, to describe the world; all possible
descriptions are equally invalid because we cannot be sure that any description is reliable." Id.
124. Id.
125. Oflen, these discussions reference the Nazi flirtation with Nietzchian nihilistic thought
and argue that nihilism provides no basis for opposing the Holocaust See, e.g. Laurence Doug-
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of these implications, most theorists who embrace the radical perspectivist
assertions of nihilism seek to distance themselves from its moral implications,
or in the alternative, try to define the term to avoid these implications. Thus,
even the most extreme nihilist leaning scholars have been accused of retreat-
ing from its precepts and acting "contrary to the radical consequences of their
position."W
2 6
Nevertheless, the embrace of the epistemic, if not the moral implications
of nihilism, has a profound impact on one's rhetoric. Taken at face value, in
fact, the correct response to nihilism for a legal scholar might be to give up or
at least to think twice before setting pen to paper. According to Kelman, a
leading proponent of legal nihilism, "Most of the arguments that law profes-
sors make are not only nonsensical according to some obscure and unreach-
able criteria of Universal Validity but they are also patently unstable bab-
ble. 127 But of course, neither Kelman nor any other nihilistically inclined
post-modernists have stopped writing. The legal system continues to operate,
and nihilist scholars continue to write articles."
Nihilist based scholarship, therefore, must take one of two approaches.
At its most effective level, it is essentially "gotcha" scholarship that seeks to
expose the contradictions and essentialist premises of legal scholarship and
doctrinal development." Even within the nihilist leaning community, schol-
las, Wartime Lies: Securing the Holocaust in Law andLiterature, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 367
(1995); (regory H. Hartman, IsAnAesthetic EthosPossible? Night ThoughtsAfterAuschwitz,
6 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LiERATURE 135 (1994); Daniel Stern, The Fellowship ofMen That
Die: TheLegacyofAlberiCamus, 10CAPDOZOSTUD.L.&Lr TURE183(1998). Onesuch
critic argues that "[i]n the absence of some empirical truth about human nature or some
transcendental realm of moral reality, there is no indubitable source for securing our most
cherished moral values from a disabling skepticism .... Writh nothing else to secure moral
justification, diverse or conflicting social practices seem to stand beyond rational approval or
condemnation .... Postmodernism - with its rejection of meta-narratives, deconstruction of
meaning, and decentering of the self - looks like a radicalized version of skepticism that
threatens a frightening descent into intellectual and moral chaos." Steven L. Winter, Human
Values in a Postmodern World, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 233,236-37 (1994).
126. See Chow, supra note 81, at 223-24 nA (recognizing that nihilism is difficult position
to maintain due to its "extreme skepticism").
127. Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293,322 (1984).
128. Some of Schlag's other works come closer to embracing a pragmatist position. See,
e.g., Pierre SchlagAuthorizinglnterpretation, 30 CoNN. L. REv. 1065,1089-90 (1998) (stating
that "there is never any answer to a question of constitutional interpretation other than to do the
right thing"); Pierre Schlag, Law as the Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L. REV.
427, 440 (1997) (stating that confusion and conflation between epistemic and ontological is
crucial to American idea of rule of law because it enables faith in belief that social institutions
and practices respond to reason).
129. See, e.g., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll OverBeethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1984); Kennedy, supra note 108; Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
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ars are ever vigilant with each other, seeking to rout out any rentroduction of
essentialist thought. The problem, of course, is that an honest nihilist has no
new program to offer which might reconstruct the legal system to be some-
thing other than the naked exercise of power. Thus, the only constructive
contribution of an honest nihilist-leaning scholar, such as Schlag, is to offer
an awareness or understanding that encourages people to give up on seeking
certainty in the law.130 What comes after that is left blank. In fact, the entire
conclusion of Schlag's Hiding the Ball essay consists of but three words -
"There is none.'i 3  Wbile honest for sure, the nihilist nevertheless runs out of
gas when there is nothing left to deconstruct.
Therefore, much of the rest of nihilist influenced scholarship seems in
some way to be running from its own implications. In seeking to defend them-
selves from the charge of moral relativism, nihilist leaning scholars try to find
some way back to basic notions of morality. Rather than succeeding, they
seem only to provide further opportunities for other nihilists to produce more
"gotcha" critiques.132 Thus, the radical perspectivism of nihilism leads in
some ways exactly back to the self-referential, jargon-filled scholarship of
essentialism. This is not surprising to modem rhetoricians, however, because
to a large extent the post-modems have defined themselves by oppositional
rhetoric. By defining themselves by what they oppose, they are still trapped
by dualistic thinking and, therefore, remain within an inherently Western onto-
logical frame of reference.' 33
Thus, even in its most radically skeptical and self-conscious form, the
nihilist use of the blind men and the elephant parable still reflects a Western
epistemology, albeit a post-modem Western one, rather than the non-dualistic
Eastern view.' However, an even smaller group of scholars has tried to inte-
grate the broader lessons of the parable's non-dualistic Eastern roots with
Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Gary Peller, TheMetaphysics ofAmerican Law,
73 CAIL. REV. 1151 (1985).
130. While I agree with Schlag that attempting to convince legal scholars to abandon the
quest for certainty is a constructive act, he acknowledges that this is very unsatisfying for almost
every other legal thinker. However, he argues that this has more to do "with their expectations
and desires for law" which he again asserts are unattainable. Schlag, supra note 118, at 2.
131. Schlag, supra note 84, at 1718.
132. See Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984) (criticizing Owen Fiss);
Stanley Fish, WrongAgain, 62 TEX. L. REv. 299 (1983) (criticizing Ronald Dworkin's response
to his critique); Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76
GEO. L.J. 37 (1987) (criticizing Stanley Fish); Winter, supra note 69 (arguing that Stanley
Fish's anti-foundationalist claims rest on "vestigial objectivist assumptions").
133. See MCPHAl, supra note 81, at 111-12 (indicating what poslmodemism is not).
134. Once again, I draw this comparison not to privilege the Eastern version of the parable
but simply to use contrast to reveal the various modes in which Western epistemic thinking
manifests itself.
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Western legal concepts or systems. These efforts are discussed in the next
section.
B. The Parable and Eastern Concepts of Truth in Legal Scholarship
In the context of scholarly endeavors, the Eastern version of the parable
has been used to gently remind other scholars of the need for humility in all
"endeavors of inquiry" and that "[p]retensions to knowledge are as unscien-
tific as ignorance, and more dangerous." ' Others have used the parable as
an antidote to specific essentialist assertions about a subject and note the
value of using multiple perspectives rather than privileging one. 36 More sig-
nificantly, although our legal system is based on an essentialist epistemology
and the absolute dualisms that come with it, a number of scholars have re-
cently tried to integrate the Eastern view of truth into Anglo-American legal
concepts and practice.
David Chavkin's article, Fuzzy Thinking: A Borrowed Paradigm for
Crisper Lawyering, is an excellent example of this effort. Chavkin contends
that multivarient thinking will improve clinical teaching. 37 Chavkin uses the
concept of "fuzzy sets" to challenge the essentialist Aristotelean notion that
something is either part ofa set or not.'38 For example, the question of whether
a person is tall is a question of degree rather than of tall or not tall.139 He
135. See Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific
Method, 58 FORDHAML. REV. 263,273 n.51 (1989) (exploring application of scientific method
to jurisprudence and suggesting that "attention to the principles of scientific inquiry is one
method of improving the rationality of legal decisions and theories").
136. See Cynthia Price Cohen, Introduction, Symposium: Implementation of the United
Nations Convention on theRights of the Child, 6 TRANsNAT'LL. & CONTEMP. OBS. v(1996)
(using parable to describe symposium articles); Grant Gilmore, Some Reflections on Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., 2 GREEN BAG 2D 379, 392-94 (1999) (describing Holmes jurisprudence
as deeply contradictory and noting how various legal movements have all claimed Holmes as
their own; suggesting that "[w]e deal with Holmes in our successive generations as the blind
men dealt with the elephant" and claiming "we shall never know" real Holmes); supra note 103.
A smaller group of authors use the parable to suggest the multi-variability and inaccessibility
of truth without necessarily noting the Eastern origin of the story. See Abner Mlkva, Foreword,
Symposium on the Theory ofPublic Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167,176-77 (1988) (suggesting that
public choice analysis makes claims of accuracy despite lak of data and also suggesting that
no model can capture complexity of political decision makers in political system).
137. Chavkdn, supra note 9; see also John W. Teeter, Jr., The Daishonin 'sPath: Applying
Nichiren 'sBuddhist Principles toAmerican LegalEducation, 30 MCGEORGEL.REV. 271,273
(1999) (arguing that attention to Buddhist principles of "compassion, critique, courage, and
wisdom are essential for law students and teachers alike").
138. Chavkin, supra note 9, at 167.
139. Id. at 168 (suggesting that six-foot person may be "tall" under graded membership of
.9 whereas person 5' 10" might only receive value of.7). In addition, Chavkin's evaluation of
"tallness" is contextual because it depends both on the height of the observer and the group
within which the person is being judged.
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realizes that the legal system must ultimately express itself in a bivalent result,
guilt or innocence, liable or not liable, but argues the importance of fuzzy
thinking in interviewing, theory development, counseling, and devising a
strategy to persuade the fact-finder to lean in the direction that helps the
client."4 One example Chavkin uses is the problem of "gap filling" in client
interviewing.' 4' Gap filling occurs when an interviewer fills in facts about the
client's story based upon assumptions from the attorney's pre-existing
schema.'4 2 Chavkin argues that such schema are an unhelpful product of
bivalent thinking.' 43 For example, in the typical fuzzy fact pattern, a criminal
defense client may relay six facts that correlate with guilt and not mention two
additional facts that might be indicative of innocence."' Instead of filling the
story with more guilty facts from the schema, a good interviewer searches for
and develops the two non-conforming, "fuzzy' facts. 4 5 From these non-con-
forming facts, an attorney can build a theory of the case in the face of adverse
evidence.'46 Although the term "fuzzy thinking" was coined by an electrical
engineer, Chavkin readily acknowledges its roots in Eastern philosophy, and
he cites the Jainist version of the parable. 4
Other theorists have used the Eastern version of the parable to shed light
on areas where an essentialist vision of truth retards understanding and the
possibility of reform For example, Kim Scheppele uses the parable in re-
viewing Susan Estrich's book, Real Rape: How the Legal System Victimizes
Women Who Say No.'" Scheppele argues that in acquaintance rapes, men and
women frequently perceive the same events differently.'49 Therefore, 'he
version of facts that courts find to be true in particular cases is [not] the right
or best or only truth. The idea of truth is not that simple .... Many different
140. Id. at 194.
141. Id. at 177.
142. Id. at 178-79.
143. Id. at 181-82.
144. Id. at 182.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 183. In Chavkin's words, fuzzy thinking is a way for getting students "to utilize
the client story rather that feeling trapped by it" Id.
147. Id. at 166-67. Chavkin also briefly comments on the potential of fuzzy thinking to
"fundamentally alter our perception of the nature of law." Id. at 173 n.34. In a fuzzy legal
system, he speculates, defendants would not be either guilty or not guilty, either negligent or
not negligent, but rather "the degrees of guilt and negligence would become the focus for issues
of punishment and liability." Id. The trend toward sentencing guidelines and comparative
negligence suggests such a move is underway in some areas of the law.
148. See Kim Lane Scheppele, TheRe-Vision ofRapeLaw, 54 U. CHLL. REV. 1095 (1987)
(reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: HOW THE IGAL SYSTEM VCrMIZEs WOMEN WHO
SAYNO (1987)).
149. Id. at 1104-05.
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versions of a story all may correspond with reality, just with different parts of
it, rather like the blind men with the elephant."1 50 Facing a choice between
two equally valid yet incomplete versions of the truth, however, presents a
serious problem for a judicial system premised on separating truth from
falsehood. Moreover, because judges and juries make decisions in a cultural
context, women's disparate view of what constitutes a threat, resistance, force,
or consent becomes buried or subjugated by the societally "objective" per-
spective which still favors the male perspective. Scheppele uses this
perspectivist insight to support Estrich's attempt to "re-vision" rape law in a
way that "see[s] differently.., how men and women communicate and inter-
act."151 According to Scheppele, Estrich's proposal "attempts to restructure
social practice through restructuring the kinds of facts that courts notice," and
she hopes that "making women's perceptions visible in the law" will lower the
incidence of acquaintance rapes.152 Here, Scheppele employs the Eastern view
as a frame shifting tool in the otherwise polarized debate over acquaintance
rape and provides a neutral rationale for what otherwise might be perceived
as too radical a solution. 53
At its best, scholarship based upon Eastern epistemology offers a refresh-
ing way to value different perspectives without privileging one over another.
Writers such as Chavkin and Scheppele challenge the Anglo-American legal
system to soften its strict essentialist view of the truth and to offer interesting
opportunities to improve legal practice and to spur refornm Moreover, they
develop depth and credibility by drawing on a 2000-year-old, fully developed
philosophical system. Another Western scholar, Rebecca Redwood French,
makes this exact point. She states that her study of the Tibetan legal system
enabled her to 'think more deeply about our own unacknowledged assump-
tions and the possibly contingent nature of what we assume to be essential in
our cosmology of law."'54
Another discrete group of articles has explored whether Eastern concep-
tions oftruth might be used to effect a more radical transformation of Western
legal culture. These articles are more problematic and ultimately betray a
deep uncertainty about the potential for success. Much like critical legal
150. Id. at 1095.
151. Id.at1114.
152. Id.at1115.
153. See also Sompong Sucharitkul,A Multi-Dimensional Concept of Human Rights in
International Law, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 305, 306 (1987) (invoking Buddhist version of
parable to argue that although concept of international human rights originated in West, it
should be broadened to "tolerate the plurality of concepts of human rights" and different under-
standings of role of individual in society).
154. See Huxley, supra note 82, at 1896 (quoting REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH, THE
GOLDEN YOKE: THE LEGAL COSMOLOGY OF BUDDHIST TBET 347 (1995)).
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 957 (2001)
studies, transformative articles based on Eastern concepts can be wonderful
critique pieces but struggle to find a way to change a legal system that is born
of Western philosophic beliefs. One example is John Powell's article, The
Multiple Self Exploring Between andBeyondModernityandPostmodernity.
In this article, Powell argues that Western ideas about the essentialist self are
"used to destructively frame the way we talk about the self and race.""5s By
contrasting the unitary, stable, and transparent Western self with a construct
of an anti-essentialist, intersectional selt modem theorists have "made great
strides in pushing the dialogue on identity and the subject beyond those
traditional cncepts... that have functioned to marginalize and subjugate
oppressed groups." '156 However, when one rejects the Western self, fundamen-
tal tenets of our legal system predicated on the individual, autonomous self are
also called into question.'57 For example, notions of agency and choice,
central to the individual responsibility and accountability for one's actions,
"would clearly be altered by moving away from the unitary self."58
Powell looks for assistance from Freudian theory and Buddhism because
each of these systems rejects the essentialist Western self. With insights from
these disparate theories, he draws hope that the legal view of the individual
could be constructed and fractured, without also having to believe that all else
is constructed, leaving nothing essential or unconditioned on which to base a
system of legal morality.159 Nevertheless, Powell acknowledges the difficulty
of this project. For example, in the context of racism, Powell recognizes that
current discrimination law is based on a unitary concept of self."6 Thus, when
a racialized self is harmed, the legal systems sees its job as correcting the
transaction so the racialized self is returned "to its original and rightfiul
position.' 6' However, "[blecause the postmodem self is intersubjective, and
thus dependent upon others for definition, oppression is a relational func-
tion: ... 'you cannot get rid of subordination without eliminating the privi-
lege as well." 162 In other words, contrary to existing doctrine, "there is no
155. Powell, supra note 35, at 1482.
156. Id. at 1482.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1513.
159. With regard to Buddhism, while not advocating its explicit acceptance, Powell notes
that it has "positive implications for personal and interpersonal interaction" because its model
of "self-engagement [does] not denigrate or otherwise oppress." Id. at 1508-09 (quoting ANNE
CAROLYNKLEIN, MEETING THE GREAT BLIss QUEEN: BUDDHISTS, FEMINISTS AND THEART OF
THm SmlF 80 (1995)).
160. Id. at 1514-15.
161. Id. at 1515.
162. Id. at 1516 (quoting Trina Grillo, Antiessentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to
Dismantle the Master's House, 10 BERKELEYWOMiEN'S L.J. 16, 18-19 (1995)).
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original position to which we can return the racialized self.' 63 Powell con-
cedes that "[w]hat this may require in the form ofjurisprudence is uncertain"
and that while providing insights into the problem, neither Buddhism nor
Freudian theory provides the key to solving the "discursive void that is left by
rejection of the modem unitary self." " Thus, while a fascinating rumination,
this attempt to find actual solutions to the post-modem dilemma remains for
Powell an ongoing discourse, "with no fixed resolution on the horizon.'
65
The challenge to truly melding Eastern philosophy into Western legal
theory ultimately lies in the perhaps unbridgeable differences in the funda-
mental starting principles and their practical implications. According to
Rebecca French, in Buddhism "faith and reason, logic and compassion are all
integrated." Thus, the Pali Buddhist scriptures use the "same word for truth
and keeping one's promises. Morality and epistemology are therefore inextri-
cably mingled. ' '1e One dramatic consequence of these beliefs is that under the
Tibetan legal system, most civil, and even much of the criminal process
depends on the defendant's consent rather than imposition of positive law on
the individual. 167
Nevertheless, current legal theorists see similarities between Buddhist
thinking and the postmodem approach because both positions start with an
anti-foundationalist position with regard to truth." More importantly, both
struggle with answering the charge of moral relativism. Except for the most
committed nihilists, Eastern theorists and post-modernists seem to assert that
ethical implications can be teased out of current events and history, however
tentative those conclusions may be. In this way, "the post-modem position is
entirely consistent with the view ofthe Buddha, the Boshu, and Zeno."'69 The
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1517-19.
165. Id. at 1520.
166. Huxley, supra note 82, at 1897.
167. Id.
168. Andrew Huxley's review of two recent books on Tibetan and Chinese legal history
compares and contrasts Eastern and modem Western legal epistemologies. He believes Tibetans
worked out a "unique compromise between anarchism and law" whereas Western legal thought
has been much more "statist" and has "pushed anarchism into the background." See id. at 1949-
50. He agrees that postmodern legal theory and Eastern philosophy share a hostility to the
"[o]mnipresent dualisms... [that] permeate the investigation, modeling, and presentation of
Western material on legal systems." Id. at 1949 (citing REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH, THE
GOLDEN YOKE: THE LEGAL COSMOLOGY OF BUDDHIST TIBET 343 (1995)). However, Huxley
poses the difficult question, can Westerners "think of law, history, education, and moral
behavior as aspects of the same big phenomenon?" Id. at 1949. As noted above, this is where
attempts to integrate Eastern thinking into a Western institution that is inherently dualistic are
likely to founder.
169. Id. at 1948.
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difference between the post-modem position and Buddhism, however, is that
the latter "regarded the data acquired by introspective emptying-of-the-mind
as a suitable foundation forjustifying truth claims. Seen from this angle, post-
modernism is early natural law minus meditation." 1" 0 In other words, unlike
the Buddhist who has "emptiness," postmodem theorists are still looking for
some principled foundation upon which to base a system of values in an
otherwise anti-foundationalist universe. Because of this fundamental differ-
ence between Eastern and Western ontology, neither the post-modems nor any
other Western scholars have successfully translated the Eastern grand narra-
tive into Western legal thought.
C. Pragmatism, the Parable, and Legal Scholarship
The ontological divide discussed in the preceding section dissuades most
legal scholars from looking for answers to the post-modem assault on essen-
tialism in Eastern philosophy. Instead, more have turned to a distinctively
American philosophical tradition - pragmatism - in search of a legal philoso-
phy that provides a grounding for values in a perspectivist universe. Not sur-
prisingly, some of these legal writers also turn to the blind men and the
elephant parable to explain their epistemic positions.
Before turning to these examples, it would help to understand pragma-
tism and its epistemology. As it turns out, this task is not easy. Like nihilism,
a definition of pragmatism is elusive. But, quite contrary to nihilism, the
problem with pragmatism is that too many, rather than too few, seek to claim
its mantle. Thus, while pragmatism is generally distinguished by its "orienta-
tion toward an American philosophical tradition tracing back to William
James and John Dewey,"171 today, pragmatism "accommodates a variety of
views ranging from Judge Richard Posner to philosopher Richard Rorty."172
170. Id.
171. Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First
Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 168 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
172. Id. As Farber notes, Jack Balkin has provided "wry tribute" to the diversity of views
that pragmatism accommodates in his "top ten reasons to be a legal pragmatist":
10. It works.
9. Being a legal pragmatist means never having to say you have a theory.
8. BuyAmerican.
7. If you're left-wing, you can finally find something to agree with Richard Posner
about.
6. You can read all your philosophical sources in the original.
5. If you're right-wing, you can finally find something to agree with Frank
Michelman about
4. You can avoid seeing the world in terms of rigid philosophical dichotomies (or
not).
3. Because you're socially constructed, it really isn't your fault that you became
one.
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Legal pragmatism, although narrower than philosophic pragmatism, is still no
more than "a loosely connected collection of anti-foundationalist views" that
incorporates a wide range of divergent practices." 3 This diversity exists
because legal pragmatism seeks to include rather than exclude consideration
of anything that might be helpful in resolving a hard case.174
Given its diversity of method and ideology, legal pragmatism's episte-
mology is therefore best understood by how it distinguishes itself from the
essentialist thinking it opposes."' Unlike foundationalism, which requires
"unimpeachable connections between the foundation and the edifice," '176
pragmatists prefer to speak of a web of beliefs and thus have a greater degree
of tolerance for open-ended and tentative solutions.' Some have, therefore,
concluded that pragmatists equate 'truth" with whatever "works."'1  Daniel
Farber counters, contending that pragmatism should not be considered a
reductionist theory of truth
but rather a reminder that the only available standards to apply in a given
venture are the standards we actually already have. When those standards
prove problematic, we must contend with the difficulty as best we can in
each instance, without hoping for rescue from some acontextual theory of
truthL
179
2. You can also be (a) a civic republican, (b) a feminist, (c) a deconstructionist,
(d) a case-cruncher, (e) a crit, (f) a law-and-economics type, or (g) anything
else.
1. No one has yet discovered John Dewey's anti-semitic writings forLe Soir.
Id. (quoting Jack M. Balkin, The Top Ten Reasons To Be a Legal Pragmatist, 8 CONST. COM-
MENT. 351,351(1991)).
173. Id. at 168; see J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.. 1669 (1990); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., GadamerlStatutory Interpretation, 90 CoLuM. L. REv. 609 (1990); William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 321 (1990); Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94
YALE L.J. 1567 (1985) (two followers of "Aristotelean practical reasoning"); Martha Mnow &
Elizabeth V. SpehnanIn Context, in PRAGMATISM m LAW AND So=e Y 247 (Michael Brit &
William Weaver eds., 1991); Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, in PRAGMA-
TSM rN LAW AND SOCIETY 127 (Michael Brit & William Weaver eds., 1991) (three feminist
theorists).
174. Ideally, most factors would suggest the same outcome, but when there is conflict, "the
only recourse is to make the best decision possible under the circumstances." Farber, supra note
171, at 169. While this seems open-ended, pragmatists assert that in "concrete cases it is often
possible to identify the most reasonable resolution." Id.
175. See id. at 167 (stating that legal pragmatism is not easy to define).
176. Id. at 169.
177. See id. at 169.
178. Id. at 168;seeasoHANNAHARENDT, THEHUMANCONDION306(1958)(comparing
pragmatism with idea that "man is the measure of all things").
179. Farber, supra note 171, at 168-69.
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Similarly, when Oliver Wendell Holmes, a jurist sometimes associated with
the early pragmatist movement, considered the question of trUth, he said,
"When I say that a thing is true, I mean that I cannot help believing it ....
But as there are many things that I cannot help doing that the universe can, I
do not venture to assume that my inabilities in the way of thought are inabili-
ties of the universe. I therefore define truth as the system of my limita-
tions ... 8. 1 One scholar, in an article about Holmes, uses the parable to
make this point about the nature of truth:
A pragmatic legal theorist will embed questions about law in a context and
address them for apurpose, and so may reach different and apparently incon-
sistent answers as context and purpose vary. The point ofview of the judge,
the legal commentator, the counselor, andthe legal historian oranthropologist
mightproduce analyses ofthe concept of law that seem mutually inconsistent.
There is no reason to assume in advance that these alternative accounts,
directed as they are to different purposes, are, like the different perceptions
the blind men had of the elephant, tobe reconciled in some all-comprehend-
ingmeta-account, thougha wise pragmatist will also accept as legitimate the
'philosophical' human need to generate such unifying accounts.1
2
Ian Hacking makes a further distinction with regard to pragmatists and
truth. He identifies two veins of thought.ls One group "identifies truth with-
in a discourse with what the consensus will be in the long run; another group
180. While Holmes was socially acquainted with James and other luminaries of the prag-
matist movement and his writings have a decidedly pragmatist bent at times, he personally
disavowed the label, calling James's pragmatism "an amusing humbug." Catharine Pierce Wells,
Old Fashioned Postimodernism and the Legal Theories of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 63
BROOK. L. REv. 59,63-64 (1997) (quoting 1 HoLM s-POLLocKLETTERs 139 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., 1953)). Nevertheless, several recent articles suggest that Holmes's opinions and
writings demonstrate a much closer correspondence with current pragmatism than his own direct
statements might suggest. See id.; see also Thomas C. Grey, Holmes andLegal Pragmatism, 41
STAN. L. REv. 787 (1989). Thomas Grey suggests that Holmes rejected James's pragmatism both
for personal reasons and because of his antipathy towards James's willingness to make room for
religious belief in his writings. Id. at 865-68.
181. Wells, supra note 180, at 71 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, in
CorLEcTED LEGAL PAPERs 303, 304-05 (1920)).
182. Grey, supra note 180, at 805. Interestingly, Grey posits the essentialist version of the
parable - that a sighted man could provide a "meta-narrative" of the elephant - but then dis-
agrees that this is possible, thus arriving back at the Eastern understanding.
183.. See John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332, 341 n.27
(1986) (citing IAN HACKING, REPRESENTiNG AND INTERVEING 58-63 (1983)). To Charles
Pierce, who along with John Dewey is most identified as the founder of pragmatism, cognition
does not give us direct knowledge of an external world. Rather, we use cognition to hypothe-
size about reality based on our prior cognitions. Thus, "the test of truth becomes a matter of
internal logic and coherence rather than a matter of correspondence to a preexisting noumenal
world." Wells, supra note 180, at 66.
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identifies truth with the current consensus.""' Nevertheless, these distinctions
are not troubling to pragmatists because defining "truth," at least in its abso-
lute sense, is not necessary to their project. In this way, pragmatism is not so
much a philosophy as a methodology for the pursuit of knowledge.' 85 Here,
pragmatism is decidedly optimistic. While pragmatists share with post-mod-
ernists a recognition that "even natural scientific inquiry [has] unavoidably
interpretive and culturally conditioned aspects; at the same time they believe
that humanistic and explicitly evaluative inquiry can be pursued rationally and
with the reasonable hope of progress." '186 Thus, for pragmatists, the socially
contingent nature of reality is a functional rather than philosophic insight.
Acknowledging the uniqueness of each person's viewpoint forces one to
consider that each person is truly different, "not just at different stages on a
unitary path to truth."" A pragmatist must engage in the "good faith practice
of listening as a precondition for knowledge." ' Thus, a perspectivist episte-
mology leads to an emphasis on dialogue and community rather than the isola-
tion or despair of nihilism. This viewpoint also encourages non-judgmental-
ism even towards those with whom one actively disagrees. Thus, for example,
Thomas Grey applies this inclusive, non-judgmental view even to theorists
who create essentialist, meta-narratives, even though he personally believes
such projects are unattainable!8 9
With its focus on the impact of philosophy on the individual's actual life
inthe world and its benign perspectivism, pragmatism shares some similarities
184. Stick, supra note 183, at 341 n.27. Hilary Putnam, identified with the first strand,
suggests that not only is truth best judged by "a long term convergence of beliefs" but also
suggests there is a "long term convergence of beliefs concerning the proper methods of rational-
ity.' Id.
185. See Wells, supra note 180, at 82 (suggesting that Holmes's pragmatism is one way
to understand Holmes).
186. Grey, supra note 180, at 790-9 1.
187. Wells, supra note 180, at 83.
188. Id.
189. Grey, supra note 180. There are a few additional examples of articles which appear
to use the pragmatist version of the parable although without explicit reference. Ruth Gavison
compares two books, one on natural law and the other on positivism. Her review stresses where
these authors agree rather than disagree, contending that
too much in the history of legal thought has been lost by granting primacy to
debates and polemics .... Like the six blind men, we try again and again to
describe an elephant, forever finding that we fail by emphasizing just one aspect,
by illuminating one element while obscuring others. Maybe we can never do better
than that
Gavison, supra note 89, at 1285. But Oavison goes on to suggest that the authors under review
have done a good job of benefitting from the insights of the other by refraining from "battling
caricatures." Id.
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with Buddhism's middle path.' In both, absolute truth is neither asserted nor
stated as a goal. To the contrary, as in the Eastern parable, pragmatism sug-
gests that the pursuit of absolute truth or even studying a subject from just one
perspective is counterproductive. 91 Both are skeptical of essentialism's
dualisms, such as the division of subject and object."~ Finally, like Bud-
dhism, pragmatism uses these insights as a guide for each individual's search
for knowledge rather than as a particular path to a particular truth. There is,
however, a critical difference between them. Unlike Buddhism, which sug-
gests seeking individual enlightenment in the first instance by turning in-
ward,'93 pragmatism's orientation is toward engagement and dialogue with
others. It is this decidedly outward focus that distinguishes pragmatism from
Buddhism's middle path and that also marks the distinctly pragmatic usage of
the blind men and the elephant parable.
Catherine Pierce Well's article, Old-Fashioned Postmodemism and the
Legal Theories of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., illustrates the dialogic and
optimistic elements of modem pragmatism's use ofthe parable.194 Inthis arti-
cle, Wells addresses the critics of Holmes and argues that despite his limita-
tions and "bad man" image, a salutary pragmatism lies at the root of his
jurisprudence. 9 Wells first uses the parable to explain pragmatism's commu-
nitarian approach to knowledge. 9 ' She notes that if she sees an elephant that
"no one else seems to notice," she might believe the elephant is a figment of
190. 1 am not the first to suggest that pragmatism offers a "middle way" for American legal
theory. See Peter F. Lake, Posner's Pragmatist Jurisprudence, 73 NEB. L. REV. 545, 556
(1994) (noting Poner's claim that pragmatism is "middle way" between formalism and legal
realism).
191. See Wells, supra note 180, at 63-68. Wells quotes Charles Peirce, one ofthe founders
of pragmatism, who describes the essential nature of the movement as "a method of philosophy
based upon a simple maxim: 'Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these
effects is the whole of our conception of the object.'" Id. at 63 (quoting 5 CHARLES SANDERS
PEIRCE, THE CouJcTED PAPERS OF CHARIEs SANDERS PEIRcE 5.402 (C. Hartshorne & P.
Weiss eds., 1934)). Wells then goes on to describe Peirce's pragmatism and phenomenalism
as demonstrating that viewpoint perspective, and perceptual abilities are all necessary concepts
for understanding the world. Id. at 66-67.
192. Id.; see also Catharine Pierce Wells, Why Pragmatism WorksforMe, 74 S. CAL. L.
REV. 347,352 (2000) (stating that pragmatism also denies distinction between "fact and value").
193. Many Buddhists tracts make clear that enlightenment can be found in daily life and
engagement with society, not just by renouncing the world and entering a sanga permanently.
See LAMA SURYA DAS, AWAK G THE BUDDHA WIhTHN 207,232 (1997). However, inward
focus of meditation practice is the cornerstone of Buddhist's proscription in seeking the middle
way.
194. Wells, supra note 180.
195. Id. at 60-61.
196. Id. at67.
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her imagination." Normally this question is resolved by "engaging in a
certain kind of discussion: 'I see an elephant. You don't. Am I hallucinating?
Are you blind? What do other people see? How sure are you that there is no
elephant there?"' "9 However, Wells is clear that this discussion does not
presume a Kantian "elephant" is out there. Instead, it suggests a more tenta-
five hypothesis suitable for investigation and explanation, rather than a matter
of finality arrived at either by majority rule or by reconciling all viewpoints
into a coherent whole. " In this way, Wells distinguishes the pragmatist
version of the parable from the weak perspectivist gambit in which hope is
held out that the complete elephant with be discovered.
Wells also distinguishes the pragmatist vision of reality from that of the
extreme post-modernists. These post-modernists argue that power ultimately
dominates and distorts the social construction of reality and that we are
intellectually unable to free ourselves from our own epistemological privi-
leges. Wells acknowledges the importance of power in this social construc-
tion of reality, but her concern is that such beliefs tend toward nihilism, which
offers no basis for believing reform is possible. Pragmatism, which she calls
old-fashion post-modernism, contends that "the influence of power can be
countered and minimized" by strategies that include freedom of speech and
honoring differences.2" Thus, while Wells acknowledges that post-modem
perspectivism can mean nihilism, she argues that pragmatism offers the oppor-
tunity to "become engaged members of a human community. [While t]his
membership will not solve substantive problems once and for all, [she con-
tends] it can give us a manner of proceeding."'
The complexity and diversity of pragmatist scholarship make it difficult
to summarize its strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps at its best, a pragmatist
outlook brings a sense of dynamism and accessibility to the writing it inspires.
197. Id. at 67.
198. Id. at 76. Wells then goes on to explain how the process by which the public concep-
tion of reality can be tainted by powerful interests, noting that if she sees an elephant but the
"Empress of the World" does not, she is likely to end up in the dungeon. Id. at 77.
199. Although she initially cites to the traditional version, see id. at 66 n.30, Wells then
tries different riffs to illustrate additional points, such as the Empress who doesn't see the
elephant and the blind man with acute smell and hearing who is as capable of finding elephants
as the sighted. Her creative rhetorical use of traditional rhetorical devices adds an element of
creativity and play to this piece, a style this Article endorses later. See infra notes 220-31 and
accompanying text.
200. Id. at 78-79. Returning to the parable, she analogizes that when sighted people too
easily conclude that "a person who is blind knows less about elephants than we do - [they]
completely overlook the possibility that blindness may yield insights that are unavailable to
those who are sighted" or that a blind person's heightened sense of smell or hearing might
qualify them for the job of "evicting elephants from the palace grounds." Id. at 80.
201. Id.at82.
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By drawing on multiple disciplines, pragmatist legal scholarship infuses
scholarly debate with fresh ideas and research. The pragmatists who stress
historical context and current consensus add a degree of breadth not present
in work written for a narrow elite of like-minded scholars. Moreover, pragma-
tism's emphasis on dialogue also seems to influence these scholars to make
their work more accessible and somewhat less jargon-laden. Lastly, pragma-
tism's inclusive methodology correlates well with the practice of law. After
all, good lawyers use whatever arguments advance their client's interest.
Thus, pragmatist scholarship appeals to practicing attorneys and practitioner-
scholars and can bridge the academic-practice gap frequently bemoaned in the
literature on scholarship.2°
The vein of pragmatism that stresses experimentation also has a distinct
flavor. By promising a path for reform, this type of pragmatist scholarship
brings a sense of hope and possibility that seems more attainable than the
purely theoretical models for change proposed by the radical left. 203 This
hopefulness has two aspects. In the larger sense, pragmatists believe that
radical perspectivism alone leads to a paralyzing moral relativism.2 Pragma-
tism's program for dialogue and self-examination of one's own perspective
provides "an alternative to the paralysis of philosophical skepticism."20 5 By
202. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
LegalProfession, 91 MxcIL. L. REV. 34,38-40 (1992) (describing transfer of cynicism from law
professors to their students); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., ThinkLike a Lawyer: The Dissonance Be-
tween Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1231-32 (1991) (discussing
likelihood that present system will create generation of lawyers dissatisfied with practice of
law).
203. Compare Peter Margulies, Public Interest Lawyering and the Pragmatist Dilemma,
in RENAScENT PAGmATISM (forthcoming 2001) (proposing model of integrative advocacy that
includes both dialogic and projective aspects of pragmatism in change-oriented public interest
layering) with ROBERTOM. UNGERFALSENECESS1TY: ANTINECESSlrARIANSOCIALTHEORY
IN TBE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987). Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the
Town: Why We (Still) Need a Democratic Defense of City Power, 113 HARv. L. REV. 2009,
2023 (2000) (reviewing GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNms WrIHOUT
BUI.DING WALLs (1999)) (arguing that Unger "has given theory such a dominant role that the
only constraint on our capacity to reshape ourselves and society is our lack of theoretical
imagination").
204. See L. Scott Smith, Truth and Justice on the Scaffold: A Critique of "Hired Gun"
Advocacy, 62 TEX. B.J. 1096, 1098-1103 (1999) (arguing that holding the relativity of truth as
one's guiding influence prevents one from condemning Holocaust). Smith seems to adopt
pragmatism's dialogic view by suggesting that while each of us is limited to our own perspec-
tive, "when one blind man listens to the other five, he may reasonably conclude that there are
truths about the elephant which surpass his own limited experience of it .... The fact that our
goal of arriving at 'the truth' may never be fully realized in any case does not justify the
assertion that truth is relative and a 'secondary concern' which is 'ancillary' to the litigation
process." Id. at 1099.
205. Wells, supra note 192, at 350.
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positing a methodology that opens the law to more voices, pragmatism pro-
vides one who is both a perspectivist and an advocate for change a workable
theory of law. Secondarily, pragmatists who focus on the dialogic theme are
also hopeful about the debate over legal theory and political change.2"a
The primary critique of pragmatist legal scholarship is related to the
general critique of pragmatism as a philosophy. In short, some contend that
pragmatism is not a philosophy at all but an excuse for not having one.2
Other critics argue that pragmatism contains unresolved epistemic and norma-
tive conflicts that undermine its attempt to provide a basis for values despite
its perspectivism. °a Thus, nihilists 'trash" pragmatist scholarship for failing
to fully embrace the implications of anti-foundationalism. 209  Foundation-
alist critics, on the other hand, contend that pragmatism ultimately fails to
provide a solid ground for making value judgments."' In other words, by
giving up 'the Archimedean standpoint, the pragmatist seems to have lost the
leverage to move the world."' Thus, although pragmatists seek to interweave
the tensions between coherence and experimentalism, and dialogue and pro-
206. Catharine Wells argues that "[d]ifferent viewpoints do not necessarily create an
irreducible chasm between each viewer." Id. at 359. Invoking the parable again, she argues that
we "should not stop talking in the face of seemingly irreconcilable differences." Id.
207. See, e.g., David Luban, What's PragmaticAboutLegal Pragmatism?, 18 CARDOZO
L. REV. 43, 45 (1996) ("The point is that if legal pragmatism is only eclectic, result-oriented,
historically minded antiformalism, it turns out to be a remarkably uncontroversial doctrine. It
stands free of philosophical controversy only because it stands free of all controversy, and it
avoids controversy by saying very little.").
208. See Richard Thompson Ford, Facts and Values in Pragmatism and Personhood, 48
STAN.L. REV.217,231 (1995) (reviewing MARGARETJANERUDNR PTINGPRoPERTY
(1993)) (discussing argument that pragmatists find values only by blurring line between facts
and values); Robert Justin Lipkin, CanAmerican ConstitutionalLawBePostmodern?, 42 BUFF.
L. REV. 317, 337 (1994) (arguing that postmodern pragmatism cannot offer any more than way
to view world coherently and cannot compel acceptance of any values).
209. See Singer, supra note 108, at 4 n.8 (offering jibe at pragmatism when he writes, "I
prefer not to describe my position as 'irrationalism' - except for the purposes of this footnote -
for the same reason that I decline to adopt nihilism as a way to describe myself. It would be
misleading and confusing to appear to be advocating that decisions be made 'irrationally' -
without connection with discemable goals. A better term might be pragmatism."); see also
RICHARD BERNsmiN, BEYOND OBmcTITSMANDRELATvaSM SCiENCEHERMENErncs,AND
PRAXMS 1-49, 223-31 (1983); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology ofBureaucracy in American Law,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1291-92 (1984) (arguing that world should not be understood in
relation to objective/subjective distinction).
210. This philosophical critique is also mirrored by a political one. The left argues that
"[t]o the extent that pragmatists rely on coherence with existing beliefs as the basis for deci-
sions, those beliefs limit the possibility of radical improvement" See Farber, supra note 171,
at 170. Conservatives critique pragmatism by focusing on the open-ended nature and the
experimental side of pragmatism, raising the risk of "unconstrained activism." See id. at 171.
211. Id. at 170.
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jectivity, to avoid both sets of risks,21 2 critics of pragmatism are left uncon-
vinced.
In light of these criticisms and regardless of one's political perspective,
pragmatist legal scholarship can also be seen as a complex and unstable house
built upon unresolved tensions. While pragmatism is appealing because it
attempts to balance competing strains of coherence and experimentation,
dialogue and projectivity, and anti-essentialism and the grounding of values,
pragmatism has no formula for the proper blend of each, either generally or in
each specific situation. Any particular pragmatist's resolution of an issue
becomes vulnerable to criticism that his program is utterly personal. Thus,
finishing a pragmatist article, one may be momentarily energized by the au-
thor's hopefulness. However, often, upon further reflection, the program
proposed often seems to be lacking in concrete parameters. Moreover, even if
one agrees with the author's resolution of competing considerations, one would
have difficulty applying more than the most general insights to a situation
because of the specific nature of the piece. In other words, pragmatism's
emphasis on anti-theory, while as effective as nihilism's, often only creates an
illusion of a bridge between radical perspectivism and essentialist truth.
D. The Parable and Legal Scholarship Revisited
In this section, an exploration of law review articles that employ the
parable with an awareness of its epistemic implications seems to have led to
a tour of current legal theory, with at least one representative of each major
approach to legal epistemology represented. What explains the appeal of this
story to such a diverse group? As alluded to earlier, the best answer is that
legal theory, like current philosophy and indeed modem culture, is obsessed
with epistemological concerns."' Unable to resolve the postmodern challenge
to modernism's faith in rationality, the blind men and the elephant parable
becomes a timely vehicle for encapsulating the centrality of perspectivism to
this debate. In fact, the blind men and the elephant parable is not the only
Eastern story of the perspectivist's dilemma to make its mark in current legal
theory. Other perspectivist stories, such as the Japanese film Rashomon, have
been repeatedly cited in the legal literature." 4 Thus, the frequent use of the
212. For example, Peter Margulies notes that pragmatism suffers from a tension between
projectivity and dialogue. See Margulies, supra note 203.
213. See John S. Nelson, Seven Rhetorics ofInquiry: A Provocation, in TBE RHETORIC OF
HUMAN ScIENcEs, supra note 86, at 407,412 (discussing modem philosophy's focus on epis-
temology).
214. See Orit Kamir, Judgment by Film: Socia-Legal Functions ofRashomon, 12 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 39 (2000). As this article describes, the film Rashomon consists of several
different witnesses to a sequence of events relating their personal understanding of what hap-
pened. Each witness offers a completely different version of what took place with "evident
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blind men and the elephant parable in modem legal scholarship should be seen
not as a unique phenomenon but rather as part of the search for analogies to
the legal philosophy's most vexing issue.
IV Rhetoric, Legal Scholarship & the Parable
A. Rhetorical Theory and the Parable as Trope
Two important questions have not yet been fully answered. First, why
do so many legal writers resort to a parable in conveying or elucidating their
epistemio beliefs in the first place? Second, is it significant that the parable's
point seems to depend on each author's underlying beliefs, even for those
who are aware ofthe parable's epistemic implications? Answers to these two
questions lie not in the parable itself but in rhetorical theory, both past and
present.
15
Classical rhetoric is defined as the analysis of persuasive discourse and
argumentative technique.216 In the Aristotelian model, persuasive rhetoric is
divided into logos, pathos, and ethos. Logos refers to the rational dimension
of persuasiveness wherein the speaker appeals to the listener's sense of reason
"through structured argument and evidentiary proof."21 The strength of logos,
therefore, depends on the logic and consistency of the argument itself.21
Pathos refers to the "emotional aspect ofthe matter." '219 Apathos-driven argu-
sincerity." Id. at 41. When such an example is applied in a legal context, it implies "that objc,-
tive truth is unattainable and perhaps nonexistent, and that the legal process is a place where
subjective narratives can only be evaluated against each other." Id.; see also Ann Althouse,
InvokingRashomon, 2000 WIs. L. REV. 503 (2000) (discussing political misuses of fim); David
Simon Sokolow, From Kurosawa to (Duncan) Kennedy: TheLessons ojRashomonfor Current
LegalEducation, 1991 Wis. L. RnV. 969,981 (1991) (discussing attempt to teach students with
film that what really happens depends on personal perspective).
215. John Hollander, Legal Rhetoric, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRAVE AND RHETORICIN
THE LAW 176, 176-78 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); see also Michael C. Leff,
Mo dern Sophistic and the Unil ofRhetoric, in THE RHETORIC OFHUMANSCIENCES, supra note
86, at 19 (discussing evolution of study of rhetoric).
216. SeeEDWARDP.3.CORBETr,CLASSICALRHETORICFORTHEMODERNSTUDENT34(2d
ed. 1971); Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos and LegalAudience, 99 DICK. L. REV. 85, 86 (1994)
(citing Aristotle's RHETORIc as example of persuasive discourse and argumentative technique).
217. CORBETr, supra note 216, at 34; John W. Cooley, A ClassicalApproach to Medi-
ation - Part I. Classical Rhetoric and the Art of Persuasion in Mediation, 19 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 83,92 (1993) (citing RAYMOND Ross, UNDERSTANDnGPERsUASION 7 (3d ed. 1990)).
218. Hollander, supra note 215, at 179.
219. MichaelFrostGreco-RomanAnalysisofMetaphorcReasoning,81 J.LEGALWRTING
INST. 113, 115 (1996). Although "Aristotle expressed the wish that rhetoric could deal exclu-
sively with rational appeals .... he was enough of a realist to recognize that man is often
prompted to do something or accept something by his emotions." CORBETr, supra note 216, at
34.
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ment can appeal to base needs or to the personal involvement of the listener,
or more broadly, to how the audience "feels about concepts, values, conduct,
and situations."' ° Ethos refers to the ethical appeal of an argument, which
comes "from the character of the speaker, especially as that character was
evinced in the speech itself. A man ingratiated himself with his audience -
and thereby gained their trust and admiration - if he managed to create the
impression that he was a man of intelligence, benevolence, and probity."z1
While today legal arguments are generally thought of and evaluated on the
basis of their logos,2" classical rhetoricians assumed to the contrary "that
legal arguments and analysis do not succeed solely on the basis of their logical
integrity. '  In fact, in the classical tradition, "what we would today regard
as legal education was to a significant degree education in rhetoric." 4
Classic rhetoricians were particularly interested in techniques called
tropes that could enhance all three aspects of an argument's persuasive appeal.
Tropes are "striking or unusual configuration[s] of words or phrases that
change the [ordinary] meaning of a word or words, rather than simply arrang-
ing them in a pattern of some sort."" The trope relevant to this discussion is
"metaphor," defined as an "implied comparison between two things of unlike
nature yet have something in common." '  As scholars have recently ex-
220. Cooley, supra note 217, at 92.
221. CoRBETT, supra note 216, at 35; see also Cooley, supra note 217, at 92 (citing JAMES
WHIm, THE LEGALIMAGINATION: STUDIES INThENATuRE OF LEGAL THOUcHT AND EXPRES-
SION 815 (1973)).
222. More recently, outsider and narrative scholarship has broughtpathos into the picture,
intentionally using the power of stories to create scholarship that makes the reader feel as well
as think.
223. Frost, supra note 219, at 115.
224. J. M. Balkin,A Night in the Topics: The Reason of LegalRhetoric and the Rhetoric
ofLegalReasoning, in LAW' sSTORIES: NARRATIVEAND RHETORICINTHELAW211,211 (Peter
Brooks & Paul Gerwirtz eds., 1996).
225. See Scott Brewer, Figuring The Law: Holism and Tropological Inference in Legal
Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 823, 828 n.24 (1988) (citing RICHARD LAN9AM, AHANDUST OF
RHETORICAL TERMS (1968)) (discussing difficulty of finding core definition of trope that covers
all rhetorical theories). The meaning and operation of the "trope" has differed throughout the
Western rhetorical tradition and among different theorists. Brewer explains that "tlhe concept
of the trope evolved from being only a minor element in rhetorical taxonomy to occupying its
current predominant place in Western rhetorical and literary theory. The concept of the trope
in Western culture'had its origins in the elaborate rhetorical taxonomies of Aristotle, Cicero,
Quintilian, and other theorists." Id.; see also JAMES MURPHY, RHETORIC IN THE MIDDLE AGES
20 (1974) (discussing Cicero). Although in earlier Greek theories of rhetoric the trope played
a relatively minor role as a means of achieving dignitas, Ciceronian rhetoric gave it a more
prominent place in rhetorical theory. As Ciceronian theory came to dominate Western thinking
about rhetoric, so did its emphasis on the trope (and the closely related figure of speech), so that
rhetoric as a discipline has become almost identified with the use of tropes and figures. PETER
DIXON, RHETORIC 36-38 (1971).
226. CORBETT, supra note 216, at 479.
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plored, judicial opinions are rich in metaphoric language. According to
Michael Frost, "frequently and almost instinctively lawyers use figurative and
metaphoric language when they want to emphasize and crystallize their argu-
ments and analysis."' However, metaphors do more for the logos of an argu-
ment than just condense or clarify. Metaphors can challenge "the audience to
seek resemblances where none usually exist .... For Aristotle, the act of
understanding or 'solving' a metaphor is similar to solving a riddle; in both
cases the solving is itself an act of learning."'' However, the rhetorical power
of metaphors lies in their simultaneous appeal to pathos and ethos.' Meta-
phoric language invites the reader or listener to become emotionally involved
with an argument by appreciating the connection and the surprise that a good
metaphor inspires." Aristotle also noted in his RHETORIC that the selection
of an apt metaphor also "indicates the advocate's resourcefulness and insight"
and thus enhances his ethos as well." 1
Within rhetoric, parables are classified as extended metaphors. A parable
teaches its moral lesson metaphorically because the details of the story stand
for a larger meaning." 2 Parables, however, can have a rhetorical advantage
over ordinary metaphors. When a parable comes from a dominant religious
tradition or is deeply embedded in a culture's folkloric wisdom, it can be
counted upon to evoke a strong pathos from the audience. Moreover, to the
extent that the speaker allies himself with the parable's religious or historical
227. Frost, supra note 219, at 113; see also Michael . YelnoskyIfYou Write 14 ()he Will
Come: Judicial Opinions, Metaphors, Baseball, and "The Sex Stuff," 28 CONN. L. REV. 813
(1996) (discussing judges' use of baseball metaphors in opinions); David U Zlotnick, Battered
Women &Justice Scalia, 41 AIZ. L. REv. 847,859 n.82-86 (1999) (citing usage of metaphors
by lawyers).
228. Frost, supra note 219, at 118. "Cicero too commended metaphors for their ability to
convey complex ideas concisely. Quintilian observed that metaphors work subtly... " Id. at
119. Bernard Hibbitts argues that metaphors are "fundamental tools of thought and reasoning"
and, therefore, they can be used as creative tools that extend and reshape legal language. Zlot-
nick, supra note 227, at 859 n.82 (citing Hibbitts, supra note 69, at 233-35).
229. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 219, at 129 (equating farm metaphor used by judge in
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), to style exemplified by Quintilian
and his conscious attempt "to establish or increase his own credibility or ethos by playing on
the emotional content orpathos of a particular metaphor").
230. Frost, supra note 219, at 121. As Quintilian observed, "[T]he more remote the
[metaphor] is from the subject to which it is applied, the greater will be the impression of
novelty and the unexpected which it produces." Id. (quoting 3 QUNTIAN, at 253) (emphasis
added). "The most characteristic emotional response that classical analysts ascribe to metaphors
is pleasure." Id. at 120.
231. Id. at 126. While Aristotle and Cicero made only modest claims for a metaphor's
contribution to ethos, Quintilian thought that "good metaphors make an appreciable contribu-
tion to the advocate's ethos." Id. at 126-27.
232. See CORBETr, supra note 216, at 479-80.
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moral, his ethos is enhanced more so than if he merely employed a metaphor
of his own creation. With this background, much like trial lawyers who have
long relied on Bible parables to establish a rhetorical foundation for their
closing arguments, it is not surprising that legal scholars have turned to an
ancient, but still well known parable to convey their epistemic beliefs and
arguments.
233
Turning to the second question, the chameleon-like quality of the blind
men and the elephant parable in legal scholarship also has its roots in a
tropologic understanding of metaphor. A key feature of metaphors is their
inherent malleability. This malleability arises from the condensed nature of
metaphor; a metaphor asserts a comparison but does not make the comparison
explicit. A consequence of this omission is that the boundaries of a meta-
phor's meaning are "left to the reader's imagination."' This feature leaves
a metaphor open to disparate but supportable interpretations by members of
the audience.235 The malleability of metaphoric stories explains why although
the original version of the blind men and the elephant parable endorsed
perspectivism, the basic storyline is now used quite differently. Specifically,
the meaning given to the critical symbol, "blindness," seems to determine the
epistemic moral of the parable. To the extent that intellectual blindness is
seen as an unalterable element of the human condition, the moral remains the
Eastern version. If blindness is perceived either as afflicting only some or as
a disability that can be overcome, whether by co-operation or technological
progress, the moral begins to shift to a Western orientation. However, while
malleability helps account for this parable's appeal to legal scholars holding
very different epistemic views, the general rhetorical appeal of metaphors and
parables to legal scholars goes much further.
233. Moreover, in addition to stories like the blind men and the elephant parable, classic
hypotheticals and even individual scholars (such as Duncan Kennedy or Richard Posner) have
become markers in legal scholarship for particular debates or ideas. By invoking these markers,
scholars are placing themselves in a context or are using shorthand to express a complex set of
ideas. SeePierre SchlagNo Vehicles in the Park 23 SEATILEU. L.REV. 381,389 (1999) (dis-
cussing misguided prevalence of articles discussing H.L.A Hart's hypothetical statute that
forbids "vehicles in the park.").
234. MichaelBoudinAntitrustDocfrmne and the Sway ofMetaphor, 75 GEO. L.J. 395,407
(1986); see, e.g., Hibbitts, supra note 69, at 233-34 (noting that good metaphor may subvert
original meaning); James E. Murray, UnderstandingLaw asMetaphor, 34 .LEGAL EDUC. 714
(1984) (arguing that analogical, metaphoric thinking may be fundamental to law); Yelnosky,
supra note 227, at 815-16 (noting that metaphor may confuse reader if he gives it different
meaning than author intended).
235. Metaphors therefore permit the common law advocate or judge to extend an existing
rule to a new situation or to create a new rule without saying so explicitly and without delineat-
ing the extent of the change. See Hollander, supra note 215, at 185-86 (questioning degree to
which well known metaphors have authoritative, precedential value in judicial opinions).
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First, one must recognize distinct rhetorical agendas ofthe full-time legal
academician engaged in scholarly work. Clearly, an author's first rhetorical
agenda is to choose the best arguments available to support his or her thesis.
The rhetoric that supports this agenda is both explicit and obvious. At the
same time, academicians engage in scholarship for other reasons: i.e., to
advance a political agenda or simply to improve their standing among their
peers.236 These more implicit agendas have their own rhetorical imperatives.
Obviously, in a perfect academic world, each work would be evaluated on its
merits, regardless of authorship. 7 But with thousands of articles being pub-
lished in hundreds of student and peer edited journals, it is often an author's
perceived status that influences an article's impact. Certainly, an author's
status, or ethos, is often based on factors external to the work itselt such as
the reputation of the scholar's academic home and the reception of their past
work." , As the ancient rhetoricians noted, delivery also impacts ethos. Thus,
some of the rhetoric of a typical piece of legal scholarship is designed to first
persuade law review editors to publish and then to encourage scholars to read
and cite the piece. 9
Among the many factors that contribute to the perception that the work
is important is the self confidence projected by the work itself.24 Thus, for
the arrogant doctrinalist, the parable's rhetorical assertions of breadth, origi-
nality, and truth are part of an implicit rhetoric of self-promotion that is
distinct from the logos of the thesis.24 For those I have called inter-discipli-
narians and optimists, the parable's rhetorical message is slightly different,
but functionally similar. Here the parable expresses confidence in the ulti-
mate solution of a problem to which the author claims to be making a valuable
contribution. Rhetorically speaking, this is wise, for there is little appeal to
236. Many faculty members view themselves as independent contractors, each doing
essentially independent work and competing with each other for the perks doled out by the
administration. While this model captures a great deal of academic life, I have always felt that
the feudal model better summarizes the interactions among tenured and untenured faculty and
deans.
237. This ideal runs counter to the old saw among legal academics about the three rules
of the article selection process: "Something by somebody, nothing by somebody, or something
by nobody."
238. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text The status of the journal in which the
article appears also seems to "count" to many law faculties' assessments of the worth of the
work.
239. This is true regardless of whether the underlying motivation for the piece is the
author's belief in the essentialist truth of his thesis, his desire to achieve his political objectives,
or simply his attempt to advance his career.
240. Within law review articles, other rhetorical, stylized features are part of the rhetorical
structure as well, such as an article's length and number of footnotes.
241. See supra notes 49-90 and accompanying text.
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an article that states it is a contribution to a problem that is unlikely ever to be
solved.
242
Metaphors and parables are not just the self-promotional tools of modem
legal scholars. Just as they did for the classic rhetoricians, metaphors and
parables contribute to the logos of legal scholarship - indeed to its very crea-
tion. The classic rhetorician's first step for every speech was inventlo: the
unique challenge of formulating the arguments for the topic at issue.243 Thus,
classic rhetoric disputed the opposition between rhetoric and substance. 2 4
Cicero also asserted thatthe speaker who had "a native, intuitive sense forprop-
er arguments" had a great advantage over those who selected arguments by
method or mere diligence.245 Inventio is particularly critical to legal scholars
because scholarship is most often judged on its creativity.246 This evaluation
depends in large part on an article's ability to make readers think differently
about its subject matter.247 Metaphoric language helps legal scholars face this
challenge. Because every metaphor requires an interpretative act by the reader,
a writer's ability to express a proposition in an apt metaphor creates a space for
the audience to be stimulated by the idea across a range of meaning and even
in directions unanticipated by the author. Moreover, because a succinct meta-
phor evokes a strong pathos of appreciation, legal scholars can get more
242. Another example far from the epistemic issues discussed in this Article demonstrates
the importance of thinking about one's rhetoric of ethos. One of the most cited law review
articles of all time is John Hart Ely's article attacking the reasoning of Roe v. Wade. John Hart
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920 (1973). In his
introduction, however, Ely declares his personal support for a woman's right to chose abortion.
Id. at 923. Certainly, this declaration of personal opinion does not support the logos of the
article and its presence still serves to irk both supporters of abortion rights and purists in legal
scholarship. See id. However, his stated opposition to the possible consequence of his argu-
ments (the overturning of a decision whose result he supports), quite possibly garners credibility
for his critique of the decision. Id. at 947. Spending one's hard won ethos in this fashion is
exceedingly dangerous in academia, and it is unlikely that someone of lesser,stature would have
tried such a rhetorical ploy.
243. CORBETT, supra note 216, at 33.
244. Invention is the first canon of rhetoric. "The skill of invention is concerned with dis-
covering and formulating arguments on any subject, opinions on the resolution of any problem,
or reasons for or against any proposed course of action." Balkin, supra note 224, at 212.
245. CORBETT, supra note 216, at 33.
246. Certainly, scholarship is also evaluated on the depth of research and quality of
writing, but those qualities alone translate as merely workman-like and enjoyable. See Lasson,
supra note 76, at 935 (stating that scholarship must provide analysis that increases reader's
understanding of problem).
247. One legal historian acknowledged that the impetus for many of his projects began
with a sense of some insight that was different than the current consensus. He further acknowl-
edged that his belief that he had something different to say was often the dominant reason for
choosing a project For this type of scholar, the underlying logos serves the personal rhetorical
agenda - to be seen as someone who is clever, thoughtful, and even profound.
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rhetorical bang from a comparison stated as ametaphor than as a simple logical
proposition. Thus, legal scholars have frequently gone to the "metaphoric
well" to craft critical elements oftheir theses.24 Inthis context, the blind men
and the elephant parable is simply a recurring example of how metaphoric
language plays an important role in legal scholarly activity.249
Indeed, carrying this concept even farther, some current rhetoricians
have asserted that much academic scholarship "is only debased poetry, a mix-
ture of metaphors, images and ambitious language."" ° Influenced bythe same
post-modem attack that provoked the epistemic crisis in legal theory, these
rhetoricians argue that academicians can no longer deny the rhetoric they use
to give their work the veneer of objectivity. 1 Instead, claiming an epistemic
kindred with the early Greek sophists, 2 they use rhetoric to examine aca-
demic work as "an incomplete, ambiguous, and uncertain world, interpreted
and understood by means of language." 3 Their basic premise, therefore, is
248. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA. L. REv. 1697, 1698
(1999) (examining how use of market terms affects problems in election law).
249. Examples of metaphoric legal rules have become commonplace throughout legal
scholarship. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Beyer, The SecondLine: Reconstructing the jazzMetaphor
in CriticalRace Theory, 88 GEO. L.J. 537,538 (2000) (commenting on use ofjazz as metaphor
when discussing critical race theory); Timothy A. Canova, GlobalFinance and the International
Monetary Fund's Neoliberal Agenda: The Threat to the Employmen4 Ethnic Identit, and
CulturalPluralism ofLatinalo Communities, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547,1556 (2000) (noting
that "race to the bottom" metaphor, first introduced in corporate law scholarship, has wide
application to transnational financial developments); Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth
v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1534, 1569 (1999) (noting phenomenon of life cycle metaphors
throughout regulatory scholarship); Alani Golanski, Kahn 'sReign andltsMetaphorsforLaw-
A Critique in the Philosophy ofLegal Culture, 27 S.U. L. REV. 89,133 (2000) (discussing use
of"law-as-religion" metaphor); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional
Law, 108 YALE L.J 1225, 1309 (1999) (noting use of tourism as metaphor describing some
forms of comparative law scholarship); Joan WflllamsDo Wives Own Half.? Winningfor Wives
After Wendt, 32 CONN. L. REV. 249,252 (2000) (importing commercial metaphors into family
law matters). This is not to say that creativity is not important to the rhetoric of attorneys and
judges. I only suggest that for legal scholarship, it is more central to the task.
250. Nelson, supra note 213, at 416 (citing Anatole Broyard, Sadder Music and Stronger
Poetics, N.Y. Times Book Review, Apr. 27, 1986, at 14, 15). Another modem rhetorician
states, "Every utterance come from somewhere, takes some shape, becomes knowable as a style,
and occurs on some occasion for some audience, revealing in the process some usually unartic-
ulated assumptions about epistemology, about human nature, about language." Jan Corder
[handout on file with author].
251. Leff, supranote215,at22.
252. Nelson et al., supra note 86, at 5. Socrates was a sophist but beginning with his
student Plato and through Descartes, Western philosophers saw themselves as truth seekers and
relegated rhetoric to courtroom hacks. Id.
253. EileenA. Scallen, ClassicalRhetoric, PracticalReasoning, and the Law ofEvidence,
44 AM. U. L. REV. 1717, 1724 (1995) (quoting SONA YIK FOSS ET AL, CONMPORARY PER-
SPEcVEs oNRHETORIC 3 (2d ed. 1991)).
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that "[sicholarship uses argument, and argument uses rhetoric.... Inmatters
from mathematical proof to literary criticism, scholars write rhetorically." 4
As its task, post-modem rhetoric seeks to study the structure of academic
discourse. While maintaining that all disciplines rely on rhetorical argumenta-
tion, post-modem rhetorical theory contends that "[e]very field is defined by
its own special devices and patterns of rhetoric - by existence theorems,
arguments from invisible hands, and appeals to textual probabilities or ar-
chives - themselves textures of rhetoric." 5  While the full range of insights
that has resulted from the application of post-modem rhetorical theory to legal
discourse is beyond the scope of this Article, the recent legal scholarship in
this area generally shares the view that a more self-conscious approach to the
rhetoric of legal discourse is the first step." This process begins by looking
at scholarship "as a practice that is carried out by a community."" This raises
one more question: How does legal scholarship's treatment of epistemic
issues impact the rhetorical structure of the discourse?"5
Some contend that the feature that most distinguishes legal scholarly
rhetoric from other academic disciplines is its prescriptive voice - its con-
254. Nelson et al., supra note 86, at 3; see also Rubin, supra note 73, at 1842 (contending
that legal scholarship does not consist of "disembodied utterances, existing in some neutral
space where they can be objectively evaluated. Rather, they are acts of speech, initiated by a
particular speaker, or kind of speaker, and directed toward a particular audience.... Whatever
voice they use, these acts of scholarly speech are intended to persuade their audience").
255. Nelson et al., supra note 86, at 4-5.
256. James Boyd White has written extensively on the rhetoric of legal discourse. See
James Boyd White, HERCuLES' Bow: ESSAYS ONTHE RHETORICAND THEPOETICS OF THE LAW
(1985); James Boyd White, Rhetoric and Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, in
THE RHETORIC OFHUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 86,at 298. Others have endeavored to examine
the rhetoric of particular legal issues. See Robert F. Bloomquist, The Trial ofPresident William
Jefferson Clinton: "Impartial Justice," The Court of Impeachment and Ranked Vignettes of
Praiseworthy Senatorial Rhetoric, 84 MARQ. L.REV. 383 (2000) (using tools of classic rhetoric
including ethos, pathos, and logos to evaluate speeches in Clinton impeachment debate and par-
ticularly noting use of "crossroads" metaphor in Senator McConnell's speech); Holly Doremus,
The Rhetoric and Reality ofNature Protection: Toward a New Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 11, 12 (2000) (examining how ingrained rhetoric employed in nature protection scholar-
ship has severely constrained perception of this issue and its potential solutions); Eileen A.
Scallen & William E. Wiethoff, The Ethos of Expert Witnesses: Confusing the Admissibiliy,
Sufficiency and Credibility ofExpert Testimony, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1143 (1998) (using concept
of ethos to explore recent rulings on expert testimony).
257. Rubin, supra note 73, at 1842.
258. This Article takes as given that there are differences between academic and practitio-
ner rhetoric. The accepted distinction is that scholarship is supposed to be devoted entirely to
logos whereas for practitioner's appeals, pathos and ethos are seen as having a role. See Rubin,
supra note 73, at 1846. While the discussion above refutes the notion that academic discourse
is free of pathos and ethos, this difference still exists as a matter of degree. See also infra notes
272-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of outsider scholarship and pathos.
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sciously declared desire to improve the performance of legal decision makers
by critiquing judicial opinions. 9 This rhetorical model of legal scholarship
does seem to capture the logos of much doctrinal scholarship, and it does dis-
tinguish legal scholarship from the still dominant objective rhetoric of the
sciences and social sciences. However, the explicit rhetorical agenda ofimuch
of today's legal scholarship seems broader than just doctrinal advocacy. On
one hand, there is still a strong vein of pretensions to objectivity, particularly
in model building scholarship. On the other hand, from critical legal studies
to the law and economics movement, scholars have a self avowed political
purpose broader than just critiquing judicial opinions.2 'c At the other end of
the rhetorical spectrum, the typical nihilist piece, as discussed earlier, is
usually devoted to deconstructing another's arguments much more so than
advancing a favored interpretation.26' Nevertheless, there does seem to be a
less objective, distinctively normative aspect to legal scholarship.
Focusing solely on the explicit rhetorical goals of the author, however,
yields little insight into the underlying structure of the discourse. For legal
scholarship, I believe the epistemic crisis created by the post-modem critique
of objectivity has had important structural rhetorical ramifications. Because
so many legal scholars focus on the normative and technical and ignore the
ontological and epistemic issues, they must structure their rhetoric to empha-
size the former and avoid the latter.262 Metaphors assist in this rhetorical
frame shifting. It works like this: because ametaphor's openness is not readily
apparent, each reader typically interprets the metaphor's meaning and bound-
aries unconsciously (as opposed to the explicit evaluation that takes place
when one undertakes a logic-based comparison between two things is made).
Thus, metaphors can also be used to cloak an uncertain or contradictory con-
cept in evocative and convincing language for both the author and the audi-
259. Rubin, supra note 73, at 1854.
260. "Crits" tried to unmask, and thereby undermine, the power structure that underlies
the law. See, e.g., Eric Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals, 74
TEX. L. REV. 523, 523-24 (1996) (attacking antifoundationalist theory). Similarly, outsider
scholarship seeks to bring new voices to legal discourse, again with deeper structural reforms
of both academic scholarship and the larger legal and political world in mind. See infra notes
272-75.
261. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. During a round table discussion
on scholarship at my home institution, a variety of political motivations and epistemic posi-
tions were revealed. One colleague admitted he consciously chose theses that supported his
political agenda and admitted that if he found historical evidence that undermined his political
agenda, he would drop the project rather than hurt his cause or be dishonest in his writing.
Another colleague chose to use classic liberal theory to analyze legal issues because he believes
that this philosophy best represents the intent of the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution.
262. See Schlag, supra note 84.
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ence.263 This is especially likely ifthe metaphor or parable is deeply ingrained
in some cultural context or web of belief.2" In legal scholarship, the blind
men and the elephant parable serves this purpose because it allows an author
to metaphorically assert essentialist beliefs without making them explicit. In
the post-modem era, the parable thereby serves as a stabilizing mechanism to
cloak the otherwise contradictory structure of legal rhetoric - explicit norma-
tive and political arguments side-by-side with unsupported essentialist beliefs
about ontological and epistemic issues.
2 65
This discussion of the blind men and the elephant parable as a rhetorical
trope is, therefore, an example of the broader lesson of modem rhetorical
theory - that there are benefits "from increased rhetorical self-conscious-
ness."2" Some of the benefits are practical. The more aware one is of one's
own rhetorical agendas and the underlying structure of the discourse in which
one participates, the more likely one is to be consistent and persuasive, and
conversely, the less likely to undermine some aspect of one's agenda. For
example, when a writer unselfconsciously chooses a rhetorical device, such
as the arrogant version of the blind men and the elephant parable, his readers
may be misled into thinking his epistenic agenda is grander than the more
modest goal of sharing one scholar's slice of the truth.267 In this way, rhetoric
263. This cloaked imprecision is what accounts for much of metaphor's appeal to common
law lawyers and judges. See Boudin, supra note 234, at 407 (stating that imprecision makes
metaphor sharper weapon and harder to parry); I-bbitts, supra note 69, at 268 (noting that men
use metaphors in discussions to keep other groups from participating); Yelnasky, supra note
227, at 815-16 (noting that baseball metaphor is confusing to readers).
264. See, e.g., Zlotnick, supra note 227, at 872-73 (demonstrating how subtle metaphor,
"species of a lesser included offense" was used to mask weak argument and modify doctrinal
rule in double jeopardy doctrine).
265. Rubin admits that legal scholars still quite frequently "speak of law as if it has some
fixed existence, or treat texts as repositories of unambiguous meanings that quietly await
discovery inside their web of words," but he insists these examples are solely attributable to the
less sophisticated or to lapses into professional shorthand. Rubin, supra note 73, at 1854-55.
Moreover, he asserts that the important question is "how these scholars explain their enterprise
when called upon to do so, not how they express themselves on all occasions." Id. I believe
that residual essentialism is a more pernicious problem that Rubin suggests. While a scholar
may begin his research with limited ontological goals, the process of research and writing feels
to many like discovery rather than invention, leading to both unintentional and intentional
essentialist claims. As an example, in a faculty seminar on scholarship, one professor exclaimed
that he hoped we were doing something different than writing a brief. Another later confided
that while he agreed that most scholars were unable to overcome their individual perspectives,
he believed he was able to discover objective truth in his research.
266. Nelson et al., supra note 86, at 15. Rubin argues that this requires "a community of
scholars to develop an understanding of their own pattern of thought, and to evaluate its
operation." Rubin, supra note 73, at 1843-44.
267. When pressed (and in private), many legal scholars will admit that their particular
insight in an article is not in all honesty a grand theory of the truth but merely a twist or insight
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is "essentially pragmatic in orientation, because it is directed to the solution
of difficulties placed before the student.""
B. The Parable and the Debate Over Narrative Scholarship
This Article's exploration of the blind men and the elephant parable's
role in the rhetoric of legal discourse may also shed some light on the debate
over the legitimacy of outsider and narrative scholarship. In his influential
1989 article, Storytellingfor Oppositionists and Others: A Pleafor Narrative,
Richard Delgado called for a new wave oflegal scholarship. 69 He challenged
academics to abandon the orthodoxy of formulaic, doctrinal articles and
instead to experiment with form and content using personal narratives, stories,
and parables." His agenda was overtly political. Delgado asserted that tradi-
tional scholarship's focus on the sanitized legal reasoning in judicial opinions
necessarily excluded the voices of political "outgroups" such as racial minori-
ties, the poor, gays and lesbians, and others. 1 By providing a forum for the
views of these outgroups, Delgado hoped radical legal scholars could help
undermine the ideology that disempowered these groups in the legal arena.
In some ways, Delgado has been wildly successful. The trickle of articles
became a flood. Now, the most prestigious law reviews routinely publish nar-
ratives, imaginary dialogues, and autobiographical revelations that are consid-
ered the cutting edge of legal scholarshlipY 2 But there has also been a severe
backlash, both in the literature and, some assert, in the promotion and tenure
process. More traditional legal scholars have argued that outsider scholarship
and storytelling is not legitimate and that it lacks the objectivity, rigor, and
analytic content that have been the identifying features of academic discourse
about thelaw.273 Outsiders have vigorously defended themselves. Indeed, the
debate for and against outsider scholarship comprises a literature on its own. 4
But by many accounts, this debate has gotten ugly, personal, and overblown. 5
on an existing idea that they found interesting. My point is that many fail to reflect on this issue
and examine the epistemic component of their writing at all.
268. Balkin, supra note 224, at 212.
269. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2411,2441 (1988).
270. Id. at2414.
271. Id. at2425-35.
272. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 60 (discussing use of storytelling by legal scholars).
273. Ruthann Robson, Beginning From (My) Experience: The Paradoxes of Lesbiani
Queer Narrativities, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1387, 1401-08 (1997).
274. Mary Beth Beazley & Linda H. Edwards, The Process and the Product: A Bibliogra-
phy ofScholarship AboutLegal Scholarship, 49 MERCERL. REV. 741,759-66 (1998).
275. See Farber, supra note 83, at 164 (noting that debate over pornography is ugly,
personal, and overblown). Farber discusses the "unpromising" prospects for future intellectual
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However, looking at this debate, in part, as a question of cpistemic
rhetoric takes a step back from absolutist arguments about legitimacy. First,
it may be that an implicit essentialism has helped fuel the debate. In tradi-
tional doctrinal scholarship, while vigorously contesting each other's models,
scholars basically agree about first principles; that is, scholarship is about law,
theory building, and the pursuit of an elusive and disputed but ultimately
singular truth. Outsider scholarship refuses to stay within this formalist
universe because it elevates the significance of individual subjective voices.
Arguing that the closed world of doctrine is intellectually limiting and used
to exclude the interests of oppressed minorities, outsider scholarship explicitly
rejects essentialism. 6 Because of their implicit assumptions about what the
law is, some traditional scholars see narrative scholarship as un-rigorous,
unverifiable, and, ultimately, not legal scholarship at all. In this debate, the
arrogant version of the blind men and the elephant parable can be seen as not
merely a harmless rhetorical flourish but as a symptom ofthe reification ofthe
scholarly enterprise as seen from an essentialist perspective. While an admo-
nition to refrain from essentialist rhetoric and the concomitant goal of raising
consciousness about our implicit epistemic beliefs may not resolve this
debate, greater self-reflection about the grandiosity of traditional doctrinal
models might perhaps temper the rejection of scholarship based upon very
different epistemic assumptions.
As the storytellers have pointed out, majoritarian scholarship uses story-
telling as well.2" The difference is that majoritarian stories, such as the blind
debate about pornography in light of, first, feminist Catharine MacKinnon's "uncharitable"
statements against participating in such a debate, and, second, the criticism that MacKinnon
later received from Carlin Romano, who "[iln a shrill attack on [MacKinnon's] most recent
book.. . [began] by hypothesizing a decision on his part to rape MacKinnon, which becomes
transmuted into a decision merely to write about this idea, for which he is then prosecuted." Id.;
see also Carlin Romano, Between theMotion and the Act, 257 NATION 563 (1993) (reviewing
CATHARINBA. MACKINNON, ONLYWORDS (1993); CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEEcH (1993); THE INVENTION OF PORNOGRAPHY: OBSCENIY ANDTE
ORIGaNs OFPORNOGRAPHY, 1500-1800 (Lynn Hunt ed., 1993)) (beginning reviewwith proposal
that MacKinnon should be raped so she knows difference between rape and pornography).
MacKinnon referred to Romano's book review as a "public rape." Richard Lacayo, Assault by
Paragraph, TIME, Jan. 17, 1994, at 62. As Farber suggests in his article, the "players seem
intent on brutalizing each other rather than engaging in what sportswriters call 'playing with
intelligence."' Farber, supra note 83, at 164.
276. Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path
Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296, 316 (1991)
("[M]ost outsider scholarship is not marred by the essentialism that characterizes both relational
feminism and Matsuda's early work.") (emphasis added).
277. See Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry,
46 VAND. L. REv. 665, 666 (1993) (noting use of stories, narratives, conventions, and under-
standings by empowered groups).
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men and the elephant parable, are often so imbedded in culture that it is hard
to see them as persuasive rhetoric. Moreover, because traditional stories evoke
a shared understanding, they can be made in shorthand."' Outsiders, on the
other hand, must be more explicit, precisely because they seek to counter some
existing cultural understanding. These differences impact all aspects of the
outsider scholar's rhetoric. Taking ethos as an example, much of traditional
scholarship's ethos building is by citation to previous articles by prominent
scholars on the same subject. A professed familiarity with a body of work
establishes the legitimacy of the author as a participant in the dialogue. Be-
cause little outsider scholarship existed until recently, these scholars had no
option but the risky rhetorical strategy of selling themselves and their own
stories to establish their credibility." 9 Similarly, narrative scholarship inten-
tionally places a greater emphasis onpathos, hoping to use emotion to unsettle
accepted notions of law and culture. In these ways, rhetorical theory can help
reframe and rationalize the ongoing debate over narrative scholarship. More-
over, the study of "neutral" stories, such as the blind men and the elephant
parable, can be part of this project by clearly showing how all legal scholarship
uses rhetoric's pathos and ethos as fundamental components of its enterprise.
V Conclusion
This Article has attempted to offer insights into the different groups of
scholars who have employed the blind men and the elephant parable in their
writing. For the majority of scholars who have used the parable unselfcons-
ciously, the moral of this Article might be that you can run but you cannot
hide from the ontological and epistemic questions at the heart of the discourse
of legal scholarship. Regardless ofwhether we tackle the tax code or constitu-
tional law, this exploration of one epistemically oriented parable suggests that
our beliefs about the relationship between our work and truth will resurface
in our rhetoric. However, because most writers choose their rhetorical tropes
by instinct, as a spontaneous part ofthe creative act of writing, much of what
they reveal about our deeply held beliefs about truth is communicated uninten-
tionally. ° Therefore, I suggest that the only choice we face is whether we
278. Even today, most of the stories in legal writing or advocacy tend to reinforce existing
social ideology. Nevertheless, there has been little study of the orthodox use of narrative,
stories, and parables in case law and legal scholarship. This Article hopes to contribute to that
effort.
279. See e.g., Delgado, supra note 277, at 666-67 (noting that outsiders will not be taken
seriously ifthey differ too much from traditional story); Robson, supra note 273, at 1400.
280. Richard Delgado makes a similar point Richard Delgado, Mindset &Metaphor, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1872,1874 (1990) (stating that "the choice ofmetaphors and otherword-pictures
can give a glimpse into how the writer reasons and can show the hidden contours of his or her
mental world").
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select, and then perhaps moderate, our epistemic rhetoric ourselves, or default
to one ofthe two unreflective belief systems of current legal scholarship - that
of either arrogant or optimistic essentialism.
As I noted in the Introduction, however, this Conclusion is focused more
on advocacy than on recapitulation. But this first suggestion, that legal
scholars of all stripes, not just legal theorists, more carefully consider their
epistemic assumptions might seem banal. Iftaken seriously, however, one can
never read or write a piece of legal literature the same way again. Once the
seed of epistemic self-consciousness is planted, a sense of detachment begins
to accompany one's participation in the discourse. As writers, this detach-
ment can have great benefits. It can improve the persuasive appeal of our
work and especially help to, avoid an unintentional intellectual arrogance that
seems all too often a part of the law professor's persona. It may also help us
to develop our own epistemic voices. Because the rhetorical structure of legal
discourse actively discourages an investigation of the epistemic and ontologi-
cal in favor ofthe normative and technical, it is difficult to find the right voice
to discuss our own claims about the truth of our work without sounding either
arrogant, overly hopeful, or at the other extreme, uncharacteristically insecure.
If legal scholars become willing to examine and then put their episternic
conceptions on the table, the discourse of legal scholarship will also be
enriched by the depth and likely diversity of these views.
We must begin, however, by appreciating the difficulty of achieving
epistemic distance from our own work. Legal scholarship is by its nature a
solipsistic process. A germ of an original idea or insight leads to months or
even years of intensive exploration and development. Thus, quite apart from
the external pressure to sound original and profound,"' it is easy to see how
one can come under the spell that one has achieved a monopoly on the truth
about the subject. Thus, the Buddha's advice not to become attached to our
own views might seem unrealistic for the academician. Nevertheless, there
is hope if one begins with epistemic self-awareness. This advice is similar to
Steven Winter's call for "situated self consciousness." He suggests that even
though each person's understanding is bound by their cultural and historical
context, "[w]e constantly use our imaginative capacities to recast what we find
and reconstruct our context in a variety of ways. "" We must have confidence
that the simple flux of the world produces anomalies that, when combined
with the human power of imagination, provide plenty of fodder for articles
that are worthwhile, useful, and original, and in some partial sense, still
"tue.1283  Under this approach, putting aside political objectives for the
281. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
282. W'mter, supra note 69, at 664.
283. See id. at 676 (stating that "the imaginative process of metaphoric reasoning often
produces the anomaly that prompts change").
1012
THE BUDDHA 'S PARABLE AND LEGAL RHETORIC
moment, the ontological aspiration of scholarship is to help each other under-
stand our dynamic world. It also recognizes that the best legal scholarship
comes from the same place as all creative writing - from a need to express
some personal truth. Thus, there is nothing wrong with believing that our
ideas and insights say something about truth that has not been said before, nor
with hoping that our truths will resonate and inspire others.
In essence, I am suggesting that even two thousand years later, the Bud-
dha's version of the parable has a useful message for legal scholars - that
there is a middle way through the arrogance of essentialism, the false hope for
epistemic deliverance, and the despair of nihilism. Properly understood, the
middle way of scholarly inquiry does not require us to suppress the desire to
re-conceptualize, to look for insights in other disciplines, or to deny our polit-
ical agendas. The only requirement is that we resist the myth that the avenue
we have chosen will be the one that leads to the essentialist vision of truth.
In modem terms, this Buddhist approach to legal scholarship finds a close kin
in pragmatism. In both world views, whatever we do is more a practice than
a means to an end. Like the Buddhist practice of meditation, good scholarship
requires concentration and self-discipline. But like pragmatism (and some
aspects of Buddhism), a practice is also measured by whether it has a positive
impact on one's community. 4
My second major theme draws from Part IV. In that Part, I further
warned that if we do not consider our epistemic beliefs, we risk conveying
beliefs we do not hold and weakening our arguments with contradictory rhet-
oric." s I also suggested that there are other causes of contradictory epistemic
rhetoric besides inattention, such as how the parable's Western versions
appeal to our need to inflate our ethos for purposes of publication and tenure
despite the more modest nature of our actual logos and the perhaps unresolv-
able nature of the issues we consider. Based on these observations, this
Conclusion advances two additional suggestions about scholarly rhetoric.
284. This concept of impact on one's community bears some elaboration. First, while fine
in the abstract, the divisions of culture create many "nested communities." Therefore, one must
still be careful that actions that benefit one community do not harm another. Second, let me
emphasize again that being a pragmatist or Buddhist about the practice of legal scholarship does
not suggest that one cannot choose an essentialist or nihilist position in one's works, but only
that one remain pragmatic or skeptical about the absolute truth of one's conclusions. Note also
the quintessential pragmatic nature of my advice: it is optimistic and hopeful without specifying
a particular program to be followed, or for that matter, any clear criteria for establishing that one
has achieved the goal.
285. As an example, I suggest that few authors who reflexively invoke the strongest
Western version of the parable actually intended to assert the degree of intellectual arrogance
this version conveys. The loss to ethos can be devastating if the trope is susceptible to multiple
meanings of which the author is unaware. See Frost, supra note 219, at 127 (offering Quintil-
lion's comments on bad metaphors and their effect on ethos).
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First, beyond just avoiding contradictions, a self-conscious use of rhetoric is
also about investing the same care in organizing rhetorical motifs and tropes
that we give to tracing precedent and history. My research demonstrates that
even when authors anchor a central argument with a story, parable, or well
known metaphor, they rarely do more than give a casual citation for the
trope." The result can be akin to what Mark Tushnet calls the practice of
"history lite" in legal scholarship - a term he uses to describe the practice of
selecting snippets of original historical sources to support a contemporary
position.' Similarly, Brian Leiter coined the phrase "intellectual voyeurism"
for the superficial and ill-informed quotation of serious philosophers to
impress or titillate the reader.' Similarly, one could applythe label of"Rhet-
oric Lite" or "rhetorical voyeurism"to the legal writers who use the blind men
and the elephant parable as an organizing metaphor without an investigation
of the story's history and meaning. 9
In a more positive light, reflection upon our rhetorical choices can invig-
orate our creativity, spurring the inventio at the heart of the scholarly en-
deavor. Consider this contrast: Trial lawyers choose their stories, parables,
and other tropes to make juries comfortable. If a lawyer can convince the jury
that their theory of the case is consistent with the jury's current understanding
of the world in which they live, the lawyer's client prevails. Scholarship, on
the other hand, is not always supposed to make the audience feel comfort-
able.' In other words, we can choose to use rhetorical devices to extend and
286. The inquiry I am suggesting is the genesis of this Article. While trying to decide
whether to use the parable to describe the conflicting scholarship on Justice Scalia's jurispru-
dence, I became curious about its origins and searched WESTLAW for background on the
parable. See Zlotnick, supra note 51, at 1381 (using parable to indicate perplexing divergence
of opinion in Scalia's constitutional jurisprudence).
287. Mark TushnetInterdisciplinaryLegaScholarship: The Case offHistory-In-Law, 71
CHL-KENT. L. REV. 909,910-13 (1996).
288. Brian Leiterlntellectual Voyeurism inLegalScholarship, 4 YALE J.L. &HUMAN. 79,
80 (1992). Although Tushnet used Leiter's article as ajumping offpoint, others feel that Leiter's
attack on Gerald Frug was the ultimate "gotcha" scholarship aimed simply to prove that Leiter
had a Ph.D. in philosophy and Frog did not, without further illuminating the underlying issues
at stake in the subject piece.
289. See supra notes 6-8, 43-47, and accompanying text. Moreover, this critique reaches
some of the scholars in Part Ill who clearly recognized the parable's epistemic implications.
Note, however, that I am not suggesting that we must research every metaphor or literary al-
lusion we use. That would be impracticable and pointless. Rather, I only suggest that when a
legal scholar chooses a trope as a central motif, it behooves her to investigate it more than
superficially.
290. This is not to be confused with conforming to a standard format with introduction and
footnotes. In fact, even the outsider and narrative scholarship have their own internal norms.
My point is directed to content.
1014
THE B UDDHA 'S PARABLE AND LEGAL RUETORIC1
challenge our conceptions of the subject matter rather than reify it.291 Thus,
this Article challenges scholars to do more than just understand the history of
the parable or well-known metaphor they select. If possible, instead of being
satisfied with the conventional meaning, scholars should instead look for a
way to use the familiar in unfamiliar ways.' In fact, several writers have
done exactly this with the blind men and the elephant parable with great
effect. For example, D. Marvin Jones argues in his essay, "We're All Stuck
Here for Awhile": Law and the Social Construction of the Black Male, that
"[w]e have a name for race but no name for the racialization of male iden-
tity." 93 To bring home this point metaphorically, he invokes the blind men
and elephant story but with an intentional twist. He suggests that for this
issue, it is not just that we all describe the elephant differently, but that
we bump into the elephant without "seeing" an elephant in the cave at all.
It is not merely that we have no idea how the elephant looks as a whole, we
have no paradigm, no discursive vocabulaiy in which we could examine
with our mind's eye our observations of the phenomenon into which we
keep bumping. M
This image of the blind men bumping into something in the cave and having
no words to describe their impressions (rather than the familiar partial descrip-
tions in the original story), drives home his point about the deep and en-
trenched difficulty of his issue."
291. This argument finds a home in Daniel Farber's desire for a return to a greater "play
of intelligence" in legal scholarship (which he defines as a combination of imagination, detach-
ment, and humor). Farber also argues that part of the problem is a "fixation on stylized rhetoric"
which parallels my previous contention about uncreative uses of rhetoric. Farber, supra note
83, at 165.
292. This is similar to Justice Cardozo's famous aphorism that metaphors can both liberate
and enslave. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58,61 (1926) ("Metaphors in law are to
be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving
it").
293. D. Marvin Jones, 'We'reAllStuckHereforAwhile": Law and the Social Construc-
tion ofhe BlackMale, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 35,41 (1998).
294. Id. at42.
295. This use of the parable also reinforces the better known image of black males as
invisible in our culture, first coined by Ralph Ellison in Invisible Man with which Jones begins
his essay. RALm ELsoN, INvmSmIl MAN (1952); see also Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking
Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature ofLegalReasoning, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 886, 897 n.54 (1989) (using parable to compare positive notion ofjustice being
"blind" with usual negative connotation of blindness in parable); Parren I. Mitchell & John
Alfred Turner, Jr., "Adarand 101,"7 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGALIssuEs 451,468 (1996) (suggest-
ing that advocates for minority business must teach others about meaning of Adarand or risk
being turned into parts of elephant by those who might misinterpret decision.); Zlotnick, supra
note 51 (suggesting search for unitary elephant representing Justice Scalia's constitutional
1015
1016 58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 957 (2001)
Lastly, my suggestion to use rhetorical theory to evaluate and rationalize
the debate over outsider scholarship would have come as no surprise to the
original rhetoricians. In the ancient world, rhetoric was "a means for public
deliberation about public issues under conditions of uncertainty."2 96 What
better description could there be for legal discourse in the post-modem era?'
Whether phrased interms of rhetorical theory, pragmatism or Buddhist philos-
ophy, the practice of legal scholarly discourse can only benefit from a healthy
dose of self-aware perspectivism.2rs As a counterpoint to overexposure to
one's own ideas, pressure from a tenure committee, or the insidious pull of a
persistent Western essentialism, Grant Gilmore's advice about our own work
says it best -
[TMheprincipal lessontobe drawnfrom our studyis thatthepartofwisdom
is to keep ourtheories open-ended, our assumptions tentative, ourreactions
flexible. Wemust act wemustdecide, wemustgothiswayorthat. Likethe
blind men dealingwiththe elephant we must erect hypotheses onthebasis
of inadequate evidence. That does no harm- at all events it is the human
condition from which we will not escape - so long as we do no delude
ourselves into thinidng that we have finally seen our elephant whole.2'
jurisprudence was fruitless as no such entity exists and that Scalia's opinions should be viewed
as product of three warring influences).
296. Balkin, supra note 224, at 212.
297. Self-awareness will not, however, supply a particular consensus. Rather, "[b]y
becoming aware of the inherently normative nature of the field, scholars can acknowledge that
there is no consensus, and that lack of consensus itself provides the unified vision that defines
the practice .... The entire point of standard legal scholarship is to explore and contrast the
pragmatic implications of conflicting normative positions." Rubin, supra note 73, at 1892-93.
298. A few legal scholars invoke the blind men and the elephant parable in exactly this way
while writing about topics far afield from epistemology. Thus, while these articles have a degree
of self-awareness, they note rather than belabor the epistemic implications. See Metzger &
Dalton, supra note 45, at 493-95 (using parable to criticize scholarly descriptions of corpora-
tion, then suggesting use of organizational theory, but noting that "[w]e merely hope to get a
little better picture of the elephant and whatever incremental increase in understanding that such
a picture can provide").
299. GRANT GILMORE, T-EAGEs oFAMERICANLAW 110 (1977). In this spirit, I conclude
with the words of a Buddhist sage as my comment about my contribution: "Please understand
that I am merely joining my one drop to the rivers and the oceans or adding my candle to the
sun and the moon, hoping in this way to increase even slightly the volume of water or the bril-
liance of the light" Teeter, supra note 137, at 297 (quoting Nichiren, The Fourteen Slanders,
in THE MAjoRWRrmnGs O1 NICHRENDAISHONN205, 215 (Gasho Translation Committee ed.
& trans., 1985)).
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